Method and system for partial quantity evaluated rank bidding in online auctions6871191Abstract A method and system for conducting electronic online auctions having partial quantity evaluated rank bidding is disclosed. Submitted bids are ordered on a basis of a comparative bid parameter used by an originator of an auction. The quantity required by the originator of the auction is then allocated to the offered quantities of the submitted bids based upon a ranked ordering of the bids. Claims What is claimed is: Description BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
TABLE 1
Potential Supplier Offerings
Available
Supplier Quantity (tons) Best Price if Pushed
A 60,000 $19.75/ton
B 50,000 $21.00/ton
C 75,000 $20.25/ton
D 10,000 $19.00/ton
E 20,000 $19.30/ton
F 15,000 $19.10/ton
G 18,000 $20.00/ton
In an environment having suppliers A-G defined in Table 1, an auction market for a lot of 50,000 tons of coal would be sub-optimal because it excludes potential suppliers D-G. As illustrated, suppliers D-G can only supply 10,000 tons, 20,000 tons, 15,000 tons, and 18,000 tons, respectively. The actual auction market therefore consists of a competition between suppliers A-C. The results of this limited auction market are summarized in Table 2.
TABLE 2
Scenario #1 (50,000 ton lot)
Available Competitive
Supplier Quantity (tons) Status
A 60,000 In at $20.24/ton
B 50,000 Out at $21.00/ton
C 75,000 Out at $20.25/ton
D 10,000 Not Eligible
E 20,000 Not Eligible
F 15,000 Not Eligible
G 18,000 Not Eligible
As illustrated, suppliers A-C compete until supplier B drops out at his "walk-away" price of $21.00/ton. Suppliers A and C then compete until supplier C drops out at his "walk-away" price of $20.25/ton. As the last bidder remaining in the limited auction market, supplier A can stop on a price that is slightly under the "walk-away" price of supplier C. In Table 2, this final price is illustrated as $20.24/ton. The total cost for the buyer in this scenario is therefore $20.24/ton*50,000 tons=$1,012,000. As stated above, this limited auction market is sub-optimal because suppliers D-G cannot influence the market. In the scenario detailed above, any one of suppliers D-G could have caused supplier A to lower his selling price from $20.24/ton. To encourage the participation of smaller suppliers, the buyer can choose to specify smaller lots of coal. For example, instead of defining a single lot of 50,000 tons, the buyer can specify two lots of 25,000 tons each. The definition of two separate lots of coal, however, may not have the advantageous effect of garnering a lower price for the buyer. One problem with defining two lots of 25,000 tons of coal is that the lowered quantity requirement may still be too high for a given market. In the environment of suppliers A-G of Table 1, suppliers D-G are still ineligible to compete in the auction market. To enable supplier E to compete, the buyer would have to separate the 50,000 tons of coal into three lots of similar quantity. Excessive splitting of a single lot into multiple lots is disadvantageous to the buyer due to the additional complexity of the transaction. Multiple auctions would replace the single auction for the 50,000 tons of coal. A further problem introduced by the splitting of a lot is illustrated by the auction dynamic created through the specification of two separate 25,000 ton lots of coal. This scenario is illustrated in Table 3.
TABLE 3
Scenario #2 (Two 25,000 ton lots)
Available Competitive Status
Supplier Quantity (tons) Lot 1 Lot 2
A 60,000 In at $20.30/ton Out at $20.75/ton
B 50,000 Out at $21.00/ton Out at $21.00/ton
c 75,000 Out at $20.31/ton In at $20.74/ton
D 10,000 Not Eligible Not Eligible
E 20,000 Not Eligible Not Eligible
F 15,000 Not Eligible Not Eligible
G 18,000 Not Eligible Not Eligible
As noted above, the reduction of the lot minimum from 50,000 tons to 25,000 tons is insufficient to include the participation of suppliers D-G. In the auctions for the two separate 25,000 ton lots (Lots 1 and 2) it is assumed that the closing times of the two auctions will occur sequentially. In other words, the auction for Lot 1 will close before the auction for Lot 2. In the auction for Lot 1, suppliers A-C compete until supplier B drops out at his "walk-away" price of $21.00/ton. Suppliers A and C then compete until supplier C drops out at $20.31/ton. In this example, supplier C drops out above his "walk-away" price of $20.25/ton because the smaller lot size of 25,000 tons does not generate as much interest for supplier C. Supplier C has 75,000 tons of coal to offer and is looking to make a significantly larger sale. As the last bidder remaining in the limited auction market for Lot 1, supplier A can end on a price that is slightly under the last price of supplier C. In Table 3, this ending price is illustrated as $20.30/ton. At this point, a disadvantage of splitting a 50,000 ton lot into multiple lots is readily apparent. Although the buyer is seeking to promote more competition by reducing the lot size, the buyer has inadvertently raised his buying price for half of his requirement from $20.24/ton to $20.30/ton. With the auction for Lot 1 being closed, suppliers A-C can now concentrate on bidding for the 25,000 tons of coal in Lot 2. In the auction for Lot 2, suppliers A-C compete again until supplier B drops out at his "walk-away" price of $21.00/ton. Suppliers A and C then compete against each other. Significantly, supplier A is not as "hungry" in the bidding for Lot 2 because he has already secured a sale of 25,000 tons of coal based upon his success in the auction for Lot 1. Supplier A thus has a much lower incentive to approach his original "walk-away" price of $19.75/ton. In fact, the sequential closing of multiple lots has changed supplier A's behavior by enabling supplier A to modify his "walk-away" price upward to $20.75/ton. After supplier A drops out at $20.75/ton, supplier C doesn't have to approach his "walk-away" price of $20.25/ton and can sit on a final offer of $20.70/ton. The buyer in this two-lot scenario is in a worse position as compared to the results of the single lot auction. Whereas the single lot auction resulted in total cost for the buyer of $1,012,000, the two-lot auction resulted in a total cost for the buyer of $20.30/ton*25,000 tons+$20.70/ton*25,000 tons=$1,025,000. Neither the single-lot auction nor the two-lot auction is able to effectively include the competitive presence of the smaller, hungry suppliers. Based on conventional auction implementations, the smaller, hungry suppliers can only be included if the lot size becomes small enough. Reducing the lot size, however, has the undesired effect of reducing the interest of the larger suppliers. This tradeoff is reflective of a deficiency in conventional auction systems of specifying a winner-take-all auction. The present invention represents a significant shift away from a winner-take-all auction by increasing the competitive dimensions upon which the auction process is run. The auction process of the present invention is not run solely on the basis of price. Instead, the auction process of the present invention is based upon the combination of price and quantity. This feature of the present invention allows an originator of the auction to benefit from the individual competitiveness of the smaller bidders. To illustrate the features of the present invention, consider a third coal auction scenario where a buyer specifies a single 50,000 ton lot with a 10,000 ton minimum. In this scenario, all of the smaller suppliers D-G are eligible to participate. The smaller suppliers D-G cannot supply the entire 50,000 tons of coal and are therefore competing for a portion of the lot of 50,000 tons of coal. At the same time, large suppliers A-C are attempting to secure the sale of the entire lot of 50,000 tons of coal. In this auction environment, the auction system of the present invention is not simply comparing the relative price values of received bids. Rather, the auction system of the present invention analyzes submitted bids based upon price and quantity. It should be noted that a given supplier can have more than one offering. For example, a supplier can compete with two types of coal. For simplicity, it is assumed at this point that each supplier competes with only one offering. Table 4 illustrates a possible result of the auction that is driven by the additional competitiveness of the smaller suppliers.
TABLE 4
Scenario #3 (50,000 ton lot w/10,000 ton Minimum)
Available
Supplier Quantity (tons) Competitive Status
A 60,000 Stops at $19.75/ton
B 50,000 Out at $21.00/ton
C 75,000 Out at $20.25/ton
D 10,000 Stops at < $19.75/ton
E 20,000 Stops at < $19.75/ton
F 15,000 Stops at < $19.75/ton
G 18,000 Out at $20.00/ton
As noted, the specification of a 10,000 ton minimum enables smaller suppliers D-G to drive the market. In the auction for the single lot, the entire set of potential suppliers A-G compete until supplier B drops out at his "walk-away" price of $21.00/ton. Suppliers A and C-G then compete until supplier C drops out at his "walk-away" price of $20.25/ton. Next, suppliers A and D-G compete until supplier G drops out at his "walk-away" price of $20.00/ton. At this point in the auction, suppliers A and D-F are the remaining competing suppliers. Based upon the price data in Table 1, suppliers D-F can clearly beat the best price of supplier A. However, suppliers D-F in combination can only supply 45,000 of the 50,000 tons required by the buyer. Accordingly, supplier A will be able to secure at least a portion of the 50,000 ton lot. The auction system of the present invention is not a winner-take-all environment. Rather, each bidder can end up with a portion of the overall requirement. Significantly, their captured portion of the overall requirement can represent only a fraction of the overall quantity for which they are bidding. For example, a supplier can offer to supply 30,000 tons out of a 50,000 ton requirement specified by the buyer. At the end of the auction, the supplier may capture only 20,000 tons of the 30,000 tons that he originally offered. The concept of fractional allocation to the participating suppliers is illustrated by the example buyer user interface of FIGS. 5A and 5B. The buyer user interface of FIGS. 5A and 5B includes an offering column 510, an offered quantity column 520, an offered price column 530, an "In" column 540, and an "Out" column 550. Generally, each row in the table of the buyer user interface defines an offering against which suppliers amend their bids. The quantity and price values in columns 520 and 530, respectively, identify the basic components of the submitted bid. "In" column 540 and "Out" column 550, on the other hand, represent status information for the submitted bid. In particular, "In" column 540 identifies the amount of a submitted bid that has been accepted, while "Out" column 550 identifies the amount of a submitted bid that has been rejected. At any point in time, a submitted bid can be accepted in its entirety, partially accepted, or rejected in its entirety. Acceptance during the course of an ongoing auction is conditional because bids are not finally accepted until the close of the auction. Indeed, during the course of the auction, the status of a submitted bid can be readily changed based upon the movement of fractional quantities of the auction item between "In" column 540 and "Out" column 550. The relevance of the buyer user interface of FIGS. 5A and 5B is now explained in the continuing description of auction scenario #3. As noted above, after suppliers B, C, and G drop out of the auction, suppliers A and D-F are the remaining competing suppliers. As illustrated in FIG. 5A, the relevant rows corresponding to the offers of suppliers B, C, and G indicate that no part of their offer has been accepted, or considered as being "In." In other words, their entire offered quantity of 50,000, 50,000, and 18,000, respectively, is included in "Out" column 550. FIG. 5A also illustrates the current state of competition between suppliers A and D-F. Supplier D has the leading market bid of $19.50/ton for 10,000 tons. The 10,000 ton quantity is illustrated as being "In" in its entirety. Supplier F has the next leading market bid of $19.55/ton for 15,000 tons. The 15,000 ton quantity is also illustrated as being "In" in its entirety. By the acceptance of the bids of supplier D and supplier F, half (i.e., 25,000 tons) of the buyer's specified requirement of 50,000 tons has been accounted for. The remaining 25,000 tons is currently attributed to supplier A, who has the third leading bid of $19.75/ton. Supplier A's bid of 50,000 tons can only be partially accepted because the buyer would be better off by accepting the bids for the 25,000 tons offered by the combined bids of supplier D and supplier F if the auction were to close now. Accordingly, supplier A's offering of 50,000 tons is split between "In" column 540 and "Out" column 550. Finally, supplier E's bid of $19.80/ton for 20,000 tons has been rejected in its entirety and is illustrated as being "Out" in its entirety. In the state of the auction illustrated in FIG. 5A, supplier E is currently above his "walk-away" price of $19.30/ton. Supplier E can therefore choose to lower his bid. The illustration of the buyer user interface in FIG. 5B captures the state of the auction after supplier E has submitted a new bid of $19.70/ton, down from $19.80/ton. In response to the new bid of supplier E, the auction server component recalculates the state of the auction. In the recalculation process, the auction server component determines that supplier E's new offering of $19.70/ton is better (i.e., lower) than supplier A's existing offering of $19.80/ton. Supplier E's offering of 20,000 tons is therefore accepted as indicated in the movement of the quantity of 20,000 tons from supplier E's "Out" column 550 to supplier E's "In" column 540. Having accepted supplier E's offering of 20,000 tons along with supplier D's 10,000 tons and supplier F's 15,000 tons, the auction system then determines that only 5,000 tons is remaining to be filled. This 5,000 tons is attributed to the next best bidder (supplier A) at $19.75/ton. As illustrated in FIG. 5B, supplier A's previous status of 25,000 "In" and 25,000"Out" has been changed to 5,000 "In" and 45,000 "Out." At this point in the auction, supplier A is at his "walk-away" price of $19.75/ton for 50,000 tons. Supplier A, however, could choose to modify his bid by altering both the price and volume parameters of his bid. For example, supplier A could choose to bid beneath his floor of $19.75/ton by reducing the amount of coal that he was offering to sell. For example, if supplier A was under pressure to sell at least 30,000 tons of coal, he could modify his original bid of 50,000 tons of coal at $19.75/ton to a new bid of 30,000 tons of coal at $19.65/ton. That new bid would beat supplier E's latest offering of $19.70/ton and therefor the remaining 25,000 tons of the requirement would be allocated to supplier A instead of supplier E. It should be noted that in modifying an existing bid, a supplier is prevented from reducing the volume parameter below the volume indicated in his "In" column. This action would be akin to "unbidding." As it is assumed, however, that supplier A would be unwilling to lower his bid, the auction ends in the state shown in FIG. 5B. In this state, the total cost for the buyer is $19.75/ton*5,000 tons+$19.70/ton*20,000 tons+$19.55/ton*15,000 tons+$19.55/ton*10,000 tons=$981,000. As compared to the results of $1,012,000 and $1,025,000 for scenarios #1 and #2, respectively, the non-winner-take-all environment of the present invention produces increased benefit for the buyer. In a preferred embodiment, a supplier user interface includes only the row(s) of the buyer user interface that reflect that supplier's bid(s). For example, supplier A's user interface can be configured to display the contents of only the first row of the buyer user interface of FIGS. 5A and 5B. By restricting the supplier user interface to that supplier's offerings, the supplier does not know how far below the cutoff price he is. This enables the buyer to extract a greater amount of surplus from the supplier who is willing to go the lowest. In other words, the supplier may be "In" by more than he would want to be "In" if he knew what exactly the cutoff point was. If supplier A has submitted two offerings for different types of coal, then supplier A's user interface would display the contents of two rows of the buyer user interface. It is thus a feature of the present invention that each of the suppliers can readily view their current status of one or more submitted offerings in a fractional manner. In this non-winner-take-all environment, each supplier can potentially end up with only a portion of the overall requirement. At any point in time, a submitted bid can be accepted in its entirety, partially accepted, or rejected in its entirety. If the auction server component is responsible for determining the relative competitiveness of bids, then the auction server component would transmit status information (e.g., "In" volume and "Out" volume) to the various client components. This status information is used by the client components to generate the user interface for the supplier. The determination of the change in bidding status for the bids submitted by various participating suppliers is effected through a stacked-ranked ordering process. An embodiment of the stacked-ranked ordering process of the present invention is illustrated in the flowchart of FIG. 6. In a preferred embodiment, the stacked-ranked ordering process is implemented in the auction server component, and can be performed in whole or in part upon the receipt of each additional bid. In a preferred embodiment, status information such as the "In" and "Out" quantities are transmitted to the client component of participating suppliers for display in a supplier user interface. The receipt of these parameters by the client component would enable the client component to create a supplier user interface that would include part of the buyer user interface of FIGS. 5A and 5B. In an alternative embodiment, elements of the stacked-ranked ordering process are implemented by the client component upon receipt of the appropriate bidding parameters (e.g., price and quantity values) for bids submitted by all competing suppliers. As illustrated in the flowchart of FIG. 6, the stacked-ranked ordering process begins at step 604 where the total quantity required by the originator of the auction is identified. In the context of scenario #3 described above, the total required quantity would be 50,000 tons of coal. At step 606, each of the valid bids are stacked-ranked in accordance with their relative attractiveness. In one embodiment, the relative attractiveness of competing bids is based upon the relative values of the prices offered by the participating bidders. After the bids have been stacked-ranked, the most attractive bid (e.g., bid having the lowest price in a downward auction) is retrieved at step 608. The quantity associated with the retrieved bid is then compared to the unfilled quantity of the originator of the auction. Initially, the unfilled quantity is equivalent to the total quantity specified by the originator of the auction. If the bid quantity is less than or equal to the unfilled quantity, then the entire offered quantity of the retrieved bid is accepted and considered as "In." The unfilled quantity is thereby reduced by the quantity that has been accepted at step 613. The process then loops back to step 608 where the next bid in the stacked-ranked bid list is retrieved. If the offered quantity of the retrieved bid is greater than the unfilled quantity, then the offered quantity is partially accepted and the remainder is rejected at step 614. As soon as the required quantity is reached, the loop is exited and all further offerings are marked "Out" in their entirety at step 615. The stacked-ranked ordering process of FIG. 6 is now explained with reference to the state of the auction illustrated in FIG. 5A. In the state of FIG. 5A, the loop of steps 608-610-612 has been repeated twice as the bids for supplier D and supplier F are accepted in their entirety. At that point in the stacked-ranked ordering process, the unfilled quantity is equivalent to 25,000 tons. The next bid to be retrieved at step 608 is the bid for supplier A. The offered quantity (i.e., 50,000 tons) of the bid for supplier A is greater than the unfilled quantity of 25,000 tons. Accordingly, step 614 is invoked and the offered quantity is split equally between "In" and "Out," with the remaining 25,000 tons required by the buyer being fulfilled by supplier A. The bids of suppliers B, C, E and G are marked "Out" at step 615. In the context of the state of the auction illustrated in FIG. 5B, the stacked-ranked ordering process is re-invoked upon the receipt of the new bid by supplier E. This results because supplier E's bid forces a re-ranking of the bids within the active portion of the auction market where the status of bids is changing. If the stacked-ranked ordering process is re-run in its entirety upon the receipt of supplier E's bid, then steps 608-610-612 would be repeated twice on the bids for supplier D and supplier F. The bids for supplier D and supplier F are accepted in their entirety. The next bid to be retrieved at step 608 is the bid for supplier E. The offered quantity (i.e., 20,000 tons) of the bid for supplier E is less than the unfilled quantity of 25,000 tons. Accordingly, step 612 marks the entire quantity as being "In." At this point, the unfilled quantity is 5,000 tons. This 5,000 tons is allocated to supplier A, who has the next best bid at $19.75/ton. Step 615 is invoked to mark as "Out" the bids of suppliers B, C and G. In the stacked-ranked ordering process described above, the ranking is performed relative to a submitted price. These price comparisons are permissible if the bidders are bidding identical goods. For example, as noted above, it was assumed in the coal market auction scenario that each of the bidders were bidding the same type of coal. Generally, however, all coal is not created equal. Coal is typically unique to the mine of origin. Coal can be characterized using measures such as thermal content, percentage sulfur, percentage ash, percentage water/moisture, hardness, etc. The uniqueness in the coal dictates that buyers can value the same lot of coal in a different manner depending upon their relative weighting of the various coal characteristics. The buyer's situation is also relevant to the valuation of the coal because the time frame of required delivery, the types of power generation units used by the buyer, etc. can also affect the buyer's valuation of a lot of coal. In many cases, the buyer is ultimately interested in the price per unit energy produced when the coal is processed through their power generation unit. A mechanism is therefore required to transform each of the submitted bids into a context that enables the buyer to effect an apples-to-apples comparison in choosing the most competitive bid. Typically, bids for coal are submitted on a price per physical measure of weight or volume (e.g., $/ton) basis. As noted, the raw $/ton bids of the participating suppliers cannot be readily compared to each other due at least in part to the underlying differences in the characteristics of the coal. Thus, a transformation process is needed to transform the $/ton bids for unique lots of coal into standardized units of value to the buyer (e.g., price-per-unit-of-energy bids such as cents/Million BTU or cents/KWH). After all of the $/ton bids are transformed into standardized units of value, the buyer can readily identify the market leading bids. General transformation bidding is described in greater detail in co-pending application Ser. No. 09/282,157, entitled "Method and System for Conducting Electronic Auctions with Multi-Parameter Price Equalization Bidding," filed Mar. 31, 1999, the disclosure of which is hereby expressly incorporated in the present application. The general transformation mechanism is illustrated in FIG. 7. As illustrated, bid transformation 700 represents a function (f) that is operative on input variables (x) and (a.sub.1 . . . a.sub.n). In the context of downward-price, supplier-bidding auctions, input variables (a.sub.1 . . . a.sub.n) represent non-comparative bid parameters, while input variable (x) represents a supplier comparative bid parameter (e.g., price). The output of bid transformation 700 is the buyer comparative bid parameter (y). In one embodiment, the bid transformation function (f) is a linear or non-linear analytic function that is calculated in real-time. In another embodiment, the bid transformation function (f) is a linear or non-linear function that is implemented via lookup tables. In yet another embodiment, the transformation function is a combination of an analytic linear function, analytic non-linear function, and table lookup function. The combination can be nested more than one layer deep. In the generic description of the transformation process in FIG. 7, two types of comparative bid parameters exist. A buyer comparative bid parameter (y) refers to a parameter, resulting from the transformation process, upon which the buyer will compare competing bids. A supplier comparative bid parameter (x), on the other hand, refers to an input to the transformation function (f). As noted, non-comparative bid parameters are also used as inputs to the transformation process. Unlike supplier comparative bid parameters, non-comparative bid parameters (e.g., non-price parameters) are not directly used to compare competing bids. In this transformation framework, a supplier comparative bid parameter value can be modified by the transformation process based upon non-comparative bid parameter values to yield a buyer comparative bid parameter value. Competition between bids is based on the relative magnitude of the values of the buyer comparative bid parameter associated with each of the bidders. The transformation function used in the coal market has been modeled as a linear transformation. This transformation can be represented by the algebraic function y=mx+b, where m is the multiplicative factor, b is the additive factor, x is the supplier comparative bid parameter (e.g., raw $/ton bid), and y is the buyer comparative bid parameter (e.g., transformed cents/Million BTU bid). Both the multiplicative and additive factors are based upon characteristics (e.g., coal characteristics, delivery specifications, etc.) of a submitted bid. Bids viewed in the buyer's context have been converted into the buyer comparative bid parameter (e.g., cents/Million BTU). If a supplier is permitted to view bids submitted by other competing suppliers, then those bids are detransformed from their representation as a buyer comparative bid parameter to a comparative bid parameter for that supplier. This detransformation is accomplished by solving the transformation formula for x to yield the formula x=(y-b)/m. In this detransformation process, cents/Million BTU bid values, that are to be broadcast to supplier A, are converted to $/ton bid values using the multiplicative and/or additive factors for supplier A. This detransformation has the effect of allowing supplier A to compare his prices with other prices, as if all other bidders were bidding the exact same non-price factors as supplier A. The transformation framework described above can be used in combination with the stacked-ranked ordering process of FIG. 6. Instead of stacked-ranked ordering bids based upon the offered prices (e.g., $/ton values), the stacked-ranked ordering process is performed upon calculated buyer comparative bid parameters (e.g., cents/Million BTU values). Thus, prior to the execution of step 606 in the stacked-ranked ordering process of FIG. 6, each of the submitted $/ton values are transformed into cents/Million BTU or other buyer comparative bid parameter values. After the quantity values of the submitted bids have been allocated between the "In" and "Out" categories, the status information is transmitted to the participating suppliers. The corresponding status of each of the submitted bids is displayed in a buyer user interface as illustrated in FIGS. 5A and 5B. As noted above, in a preferred embodiment, each of the suppliers can view the status of their own bids. Information on competing bids is not available. If a supplier is permitted access to details of competing bids, then the relative price offerings for competing suppliers are detransformed into that supplier's own context. To facilitate this supplier-specific view, cents/Million BTU values are detransformed into $/ton values using the multiplicative and additive factors defined for that supplier. In another embodiment, an optimization routine can be implemented to minimize the buyer's total cost. Rather than performing a linear, non-linear, or lookup table transformation of individual bids, the bids are evaluated together by an optimization program using linear programming or integer programming techniques. In linear or integer programming, the value of an "objective function" is mathematically optimized (either maximized or minimized) subject to the rate of tradeoff between available resources and the constraints on the availability of those resources. Linear or integer program applications are useful for finding the mix of resources to feed into a manufacturing or conversion process to minimize the cost of that process. It should be noted that an objective function can be defined to be maximized or minimized. For example, an auction originator might choose to minimize cost or maximize profit. For example, consider three types of coal having different specifications a, b, and c. In a simple linear transformation algorithm, the auction server would rank the coals in order of their attractiveness. Assume that a linear transformation would find coal b to be the most attractive. An optimization algorithm can improve on that outcome. For example, the optimization algorithm may determine that some mix of coal a and c would in fact be more attractive than b alone. Optimization techniques such as linear programming or integer programming can be designed to find such a solution. Integer programs are used when the solution must be the best "whole number" combination. For example, in purchasing coal, a buyer wishes to buy in whole train car or barge load increments. Thus in an application like coal, an integer program might be preferred to a linear program, which can yield fractional solutions. In the present invention, the market information fed back to auction participants is not simply a recitation of the other bids in the market, nor a simple transformation of bids into a common format. Rather, the present invention enables an interactive auction where the value of one bid is affected by the parameters and price attached to other bids in the market. In this manner, the auction server may automatically "split" lots. For example, a bidder might have submitted a bid for 1000 tons of coal, yet the auction server instantaneously calculates that the buyer's desired solution includes only 400 tons of that coal. Further, a bid can "come from behind" due to interactions with other bids. A bid that might have initially been "rejected" might subsequently be accepted when another received bid forces a re-optimization. In operation, the optimization routine runs each time a bid is received. Thus, unlike most optimizations that are run once, the present invention allows the optimization to be re-run interactively. While the invention has been described in detail and with reference to specific embodiments thereof, it will be apparent to one skilled in the art that various changes and modifications can be made therein without departing from the spirit and scope thereof. In particular, it should be noted that while the auction functions described above have been described in the context of downward-price, supplier-bidding auctions, the principals can be equally applied to upward-price, buyer-bidding auctions. For example, the principals can be applied to a case where a seller wishes to dispose of 1000 tons of recyclable paper waste, yet some buyers wish to purchase only 100 tons. Thus, it is intended that the present invention cover the modifications and variations of this invention provided they come within the scope of the appended claims and their equivalents.
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