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Tokenless biometric transaction authorization method and system5870723
Abstract
A method and system for tokenless authorization of commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system. A transaction is proposed by a seller, and the buyer signals his acceptance by entering his personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one biometric sample, forming a commercial transaction message. The commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system, where the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with previously registered buyer biometric samples. If the computer system successfully identifies the buyer, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, and the results of the transaction are presented to both buyer and seller. As a result of the invention, a buyer can conduct commercial transactions without having to use any tokens such as portable man-made memory devices such as smartcards or swipe cards. The invention allows buyers to quickly select one of a group of different financial accounts from which to transfer funds. The invention further indicates to the user that the authentic computer system was accessed by the use of a private code that is returned to the buyer after the identification is complete. The invention additionally permits an authorized buyer to alert authorities in the event of an emergency, such as when a transaction is coerced.
Claims
What is claimed is:
1. A method for tokenless authorization of commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system, the method comprising the steps of:
a. a buyer registration step, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account;
b. a seller registration step, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;
c. a proposal step, wherein the seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information;
d. an acceptance step, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, to form a commercial transaction message;
e. a transmission step, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. a buyer identification step, wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registration biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. a payment step, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; and
h. a presentation step, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller.
2. The method of claim 1 wherein the buyer identification step is accomplished preferably in less than about 2 seconds, whereby the entire commercial transaction is completed within a commercially acceptable timeframe.
3. The method of claim 1 further comprising a computer system authentication step wherein a private code, distinct from the PIN and not used to gain access to the computer system, is gathered from the buyer during the buyer registration step and presented to only the buyer during the presentation step, whereby the buyer is assured that the authentic computer system was used to process the commercial transaction.
4. The method of claim 1 wherein the buyer registers an emergency PIN during the registration step which, if entered by the buyer during the acceptance step in place of the PIN, triggers a silent alarm.
5. The method of claim 1 wherein the price information comprises any combination of the following: a list of goods and services, a seller name, a date and time, a location, and an invoice number.
6. The method of claim 1 wherein the acceptance step further comprises the buyer entering an amount that is the sum of a cash back value to the proposed transaction amount.
7. The method of claim 1 wherein the seller identification code is identical to the seller financial account.
8. The method of claim 1 wherein all communications with the computer system are encrypted.
9. The method of claim 1 wherein the biometric sample is a fingerprint.
10. The method of claim 1 wherein the biometric sample is retinal image.
11. The method of claim 1 wherein the biometric sample is a voice print.
12. The method of claim 1 further comprising a biometric theft resolution step, wherein the PIN of the buyer is changed whenever the buyer's biometric sample is determined to have been stolen.
13. The method of claim 1 further comprising a seller identification step, wherein the seller is identified by the computer system.
14. The method of claim 1 wherein the buyer is remote from the seller and communicates with the seller using a computer network.
15. The method of claim 14 wherein the computer network is any one of the group comprising the Internet, a private intranet, a telephone network, or a cable TV network.
16. The method of claim 1 further comprising a buyer re-registration check step, wherein the buyer's registration biometric samples are compared against previously designated biometric samples of certain buyers wherein if a match occurs, the computer system is alerted to the fact that the buyer has re-registered, whereby buyers who perpetrate fraud on the system can be automatically identified from their biometrics alone if and when they re-register.
17. The method of claim 16 wherein the biometrics are collected from a specific finger, such as the index finger, whereby the system can more easily detect re-registrations of previously designated biometric samples of certain buyers by limiting the number of different finger combinations the buyer can use to register without being detected.
18. The method of claim 1 further comprising a security determination step, wherein an evaluation is made using a set of security factors to determine the overall likelihood of fraud for a particular transaction.
19. The method of claim 18 wherein the security factors are selected from the group of a biometric-PIN input device security assessment, relative skill of attendant (at an attended location) to detect fraud, physical location and related neighborhood crime information, time at which the authorization takes place, number of recently failed authorization attempts originating from that device, number of recent authorizations issuing from that device related to the historical number of transactions from that device.
20. The method of claim 1 further comprising a buyer's resource determination step, wherein after successful identification of the buyer, a determination is made if the buyer has sufficient resources to pay for the transaction.
21. The method of claim 20 wherein during the buyer registration step, the buyer registers at least one buyer financial account and assigns an account index code to each buyer financial account, and during the acceptance step the buyer adds the account index code to the commercial transaction message, wherein the account index code further comprises one or more alphanumeric characters.
22. The method of claim 21 wherein during the buyer registration step, the buyer registers an emergency account index code, which when added to the commercial transaction message during the acceptance step, triggers a silent alarm.
23. The method of claim 22 wherein during the registration step, the buyer specifies any combination of actions taken upon the triggering of the silent alarm comprising artificial financial resource limits, presentation of a false private code, rejection of the transaction, or the sending of the silent alarm to the seller.
24. The method of claim 21 wherein during the buyer's resource determination step, the computer system uses the account index code that was added to the commercial transaction message to select the corresponding buyer financial account.
25. The method of claim 24 wherein the registration step further comprises assigning an account index name to an account index code.
26. The method of claim 25 further comprising an account name display step, wherein a list of accounts with their account index names can be retrieved and displayed to the buyer after a successful identification, wherein no transaction needs to take place if it is desired that the account index names be retrieved.
27. The method of claim 20 wherein during both the resource determination step and the payment step the computer system communicates with one or more external computer systems in order to perform any combination of the following steps: the resource determination, debiting the buyer's financial account, and crediting the seller's financial account.
28. The method of claim 20 wherein during the payment step, a credit authorization draft is created detailing an agreement to pay the seller from the buyer's financial account up to an amount specified during the proposal step, whereby transactions can be conducted when the exact amount to be transferred is not known at the time of authorization or when a deposit is required but the account may not ever be debited.
29. The method of claim 28 wherein during both the resource determination step and the payment step the computer system communicates with one or more external computer systems in order to perform any combination of the following steps: the resource determination or the construction of the credit authorization draft.
30. The method of claim 29 wherein one of the external computer systems comprises VISANet or MAPP.
31. A method for tokenless authorization of commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system, wherein the buyer may select one of many registered financial accounts from which to make payment, said method comprising the steps of:
a. a buyer registration step, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account, wherein each buyer financial account is assigned an account index code;
b. a seller step, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller registration financial account and a seller identification code;
c. a proposal step, wherein the seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information;
d. an acceptance step, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction an account index code and the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, forming a commercial transaction message;
e. a transmission step, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. a buyer identification steps wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registered biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. an account selection step, wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financial account using the account index code from the commercial transaction message;
h. a payment step, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, the buyer financial account is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; and
i. a presentation step, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through h) are presented to the buyer or seller, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted from one of many possible buyer accounts.
32. A method for tokenless authorization of commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system, wherein the buyer may select one of many registered financial accounts from which to make payment, with a provision for sending a silent alarm during coerced transactions, the method comprising the steps of:
a. a buyer registration step, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, at least one buyer financial account, wherein each buyer financial account is assigned an account index code, and at least one emergency account index code;
b. a seller registration step, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;
c. a proposal step, wherein the seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information;
d. an acceptance step, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction an account index code and the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, forming a commercial transaction message;
e. a transmission step, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. a buyer identification step, wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registered biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. an account selection step, wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financial account using the account index code from the commercial transaction message, and if the account index code is the same as the emergency account index code, a silent alarm is sent;
h. a payment step, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, the buyer financial account is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; and
i. a presentation step, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through h) are presented to the buyer or seller, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted from one of many possible buyer accounts, with the buyer able to signal a silent alarm during any coerced transaction.
33. A method for tokenless authorization of commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system, the method comprising the steps of:
a. a buyer registration step, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account;
b. a seller registration step, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;
c. a proposal step, wherein the seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information;
d. an acceptance step, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, forming a commercial transaction message;
e. a transmission step, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. a buyer identification step, wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registered biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. a payment step, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards;
h. a presentation step, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller; and
i. a biometric theft resolution step, wherein the PIN of the buyer is changed whenever the buyer's biometric record is determined to have been stolen.
34. A tokenless authorization system for commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer, comprising:
a. means for buyer registration, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account;
b. means for seller registration, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;
c. means for making an electronic proposal, wherein the seller offers an electronic proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information;
d. means for acceptance of the electronic proposal by the buyer, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, the seller's electronic proposal and the buyer's authentication information forming a commercial transaction message;
e. means for transmission, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. means for buyer identification, wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registration biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. means for electronic payment, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; and
h. means for status presentation, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller.
35. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for identification of the buyer wherein the buyer identification is accomplished preferably in less than about 2 seconds, whereby the entire commercial transaction is completed within a commercially acceptable timeframe.
36. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for computer system authentication wherein a private code, distinct from the PIN and not used to gain access to the computer system, is gathered from the buyer during buyer registration and presented to only the buyer during status presentation, whereby the buyer is assured that the authentic computer system was used to process the commercial transaction.
37. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for the buyer to register an emergency PIN during the buyer registration which, if entered by the buyer during buyer acceptance in place of the PIN, triggers a silent alarm.
38. The device of claim 34 wherein the price information comprises any combination of the following: a list of goods and services, a seller name, a date and time, a location, and an invoice number.
39. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for the buyer to enter an amount that is the sum of a cash back value to the proposed transaction amount during buyer acceptance.
40. The device of claim 39 wherein the seller identification code is identical to the seller financial account.
41. The device of claim 34 wherein all communications with the computer system are encrypted.
42. The device of claim 34 wherein the biometric sample is a fingerprint.
43. The device of claim 34 wherein the biometric sample is retinal image.
44. The device of claim 34 wherein the biometric sample is a voice print.
45. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for biometric theft resolution, wherein the PIN of the buyer is changed whenever the buyer's biometric sample is determined to have been stolen.
46. The device of claim 34 further comprising a means for seller identification.
47. The device of claim 34 wherein the buyer is remote from the seller and communicates with the seller using a computer network.
48. The device of claim 47 wherein the computer network is any one of the group comprising the Internet, a private intranet, a telephone network, or a cable TV network.
49. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for buyer re-registration check, wherein the buyer's registration biometric samples are compared against previously designated biometric samples of certain buyers wherein if a match occurs, the computer system is alerted to the fact that the buyer has re-registered, whereby buyers who perpetrate fraud on the system can be automatically identified from their biometrics alone if and when they re-register.
50. The device of claim 49 wherein the biometrics are collected from a specific finger, such as the index finger, whereby the system can more easily detect re-registrations of previously designated biometric samples of certain buyers by limiting the number of different finger combinations the buyer can use to register without being detected.
51. The device of claim 34 further comprising means for security determination, wherein an evaluation is made using a set of security factors to determine the overall likelihood of fraud for a particular transaction.
52. The device of claim 51 wherein the security factors are selected from the group of a biometric-PIN input device security assessment, relative skill of attendant (at an attended location) to detect fraud, physical location and related neighborhood crime information, time at which the authorization takes place, number of recently failed authorization attempts originating from that device, number of recent authorizations issuing from that device related to the historical number of transactions from that device.
53. The device of claim 34 further comprising the means for buyer's resource determination, wherein after successful identification of the buyer, a determination is made if the buyer has sufficient resources to pay for the transaction.
54. The device of claim 53 further comprising means for communication with one or more external computer systems in order to perform any combination of the following: resource determination, debiting the buyer's financial account, and crediting the seller's financial account during both resource determination and electronic payment.
55. The device of claim 53 further comprising means for creation of a credit authorization draft during the electronic payment detailing an agreement to pay the seller from the buyer's financial account up to an amount specified during the electronic proposal, whereby transactions can be conducted when the exact amount to be transferred is not known at the time of authorization or when a deposit is required but the account may not ever be debited.
56. The device of claim 55 further comprising means for communication with one or more external computer systems in order to perform any combination of the following: resource determination or construction of the credit authorization draft.
57. The device of claim 56 wherein one of the external computer systems comprises VISANet or MAPP.
58. The device of claim 53 wherein means for buyer registration further comprises means for registering at least one buyer financial account, the buyer assigning an account index code to each buyer financial account, and at the time of buyer acceptance, the buyer adds the account index code to the commercial transaction message, wherein the account index code further comprises one or more alphanumeric characters.
59. The device of claim 58 further comprising means for registration of an emergency account index code, wherein the buyer registers an emergency account index code, which when added to the commercial transaction message during the buyer acceptance, triggers a silent alarm.
60. The device of claim 59 further comprising means for the buyer to specify any combination of actions taken upon the triggering of the silent alarm comprising artificial financial resource limits, presentation of a false private code, rejection of the transaction, or the sending of the silent alarm to the seller during buyer registration.
61. The device of claim 58 wherein means for buyer's resource determination further comprises means for selecting the corresponding buyer financial account through the account index code that was added to the commercial transaction message.
62. The device of claim 61 wherein further comprising means for assigning an account index name to an account index code.
63. The device of claim 62 further comprising means for account name display, wherein a list of accounts with their account index names can be retrieved and displayed to the buyer after a successful identification, wherein no transaction needs to take place if it is desired that the account index names be retrieved.
64. A tokenless authorization system for commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system, wherein the buyer may select one of many registered financial accounts from which to make payment, the system comprising:
a. means for buyer registration, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account, and each buyer financial account is assigned an account index code;
b. means for seller registration, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;
c. means for making an electronic proposal, wherein the seller offers an electronic proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information;
d. means for acceptance of the electronic proposal by the buyer, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction an account index code and the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, the seller's electronic proposal and the buyer's authentication information forming a commercial transaction message;
e. means for transmission, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. means for buyer identification, wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registration biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. means for account selection, wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financial account using the account index code from the commercial transaction message;
h. means for electronic payment, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; and
i. means for status presentation, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller.
65. A tokenless authorization system for commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer system, wherein the buyer may select one of many registered financial accounts from which to make payment, with a provision for sending a silent alarm during coerced transactions, the system comprising:
a. means for buyer registration, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account, and each buyer financial account is assigned an account index code, and at least one emergency account index code;
b. means for seller registration, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;
c. means for making an electronic proposal, wherein the seller offers an electronic proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information;
d. means for acceptance of the electronic proposal by the buyer, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction an account index code and the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, the seller's electronic proposal and the buyer's authentication information forming a commercial transaction message;
e. means for transmission, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. means for buyer identification, wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registration biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. means for account selection, wherein the computer system obtains a buyer financial account using the account index code from the commercial transaction message, and if the account index code is the same as the emergency account index code, a silent alarm is sent;
h. means for electronic payment, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards; and
i. means for status presentation, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller, whereby a commercial transaction is conducted from one of many possible buyer accounts.
66. A tokenless authorization system for commercial transactions between a buyer and a seller using a computer, comprising:
a. means for buyer registration, wherein the buyer registers with the computer system a PIN, at least one registration biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account;
b. means for seller registration, wherein the seller registers with the computer system at least one seller financial account and a seller identification code;
c. means for making an electronic proposal, wherein the seller offers an electronic proposed commercial transaction to the buyer, the proposed commercial transaction comprising a seller identification code and price information,
d. means for acceptance of the electronic proposal by the buyer, wherein the buyer signals acceptance of the seller's proposed commercial transaction by adding to the proposed commercial transaction the buyer's personal authentication information comprising a PIN and at least one bid biometric sample wherein the bid biometric sample is obtained by the system from the buyer's person, the seller's electronic proposal and the buyer's authentication information forming a commercial transaction message;
e. means for transmission, wherein the commercial transaction message is forwarded to the computer system;
f. means for buyer identification, wherein the computer system compares the personal authentication information in the commercial transaction message with registration biometric samples for producing either a successful or failed identification of the buyer;
g. means for electronic payment, wherein upon determination of sufficient resources, a financial account of the buyer is debited and a financial account of the seller is credited, wherein a commercial transaction is conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man made memory devices such as smart cards or swipe cards;
h. means for status presentation, wherein any combination of the results of steps a) through g) are presented to the buyer or seller; and
i. means for biometric theft resolution, wherein the PIN of the buyer is changed whenever the buyer's biometric record is determined to have been stolen, and any theft of biometric information can be made useless immediately upon detection.
Description
BACKGROUND OF THE INVENTION
The use of a token, an inanimate object which confers a capability to the buyer presenting it, is pervasive in today's financial world. Whether a consumer is buying groceries with a debit card or shopping in a department store with a credit card, at the heart of that transaction is a money transfer enabled by a token, which acts to identify both the consumer as well as the financial account being accessed.
From their inception in the late 1950s, token-based financial transactions have grown increasingly more prevalent at the point of sale. However, as token-based transfers have become more popular with consumers, they have also become more popular with criminals intent on fraud. Currently, fraud losses in the industry stem from many different areas, but they are mainly either lost, stolen, or counterfeit cards.
Credit cards operate without the use of a personal identification number (PIN). This means that a lost credit card can easily be turned into cash if the card falls into the wrong hands. While theft of a token constitutes the majority of fraud in the system, fraud from counterfeit credit cards is rising rapidly. Counterfeit credit cards are manufactured by a more technically sophisticated criminal who acquires a cardholder's valid account number, produces a valid-looking counterfeit card, encodes the magnetic strip, and embosses the counterfeit plastic card with the account number. The card is then repeatedly presented to merchants until the account's credit limit is reached. Another form of loss is caused by a criminal seller or his employees who surreptitiously obtains the cardholder's account number and enter fictitious transactions against the card and then take cash out of the till. It is estimated that losses due to all types of fraud exceeds one billion dollars annually.
Generally, debit cards are used in conjunction with a personal identification number (PIN). Lost debit cards do not generally result in fraud, unless the owner of the card wrote his PIN on the card. Furthermore, successfully counterfeiting a debit card is more difficult than with a credit card, since the criminal must acquire not only the account number, but also the PIN, and then manufacture the card as in the credit card example. However, various strategies have been used to obtain PINs from unwary cardholders; these range from Trojan horse automated teller machines (ATMs) in shopping malls that dispense cash but record the PIN, to fraudulent seller point of sale devices that also record the PIN, to criminals with binoculars that watch cardholders enter PINs at ATMs. The subsequently manufactured counterfeit debit cards are then used in various ATM machines until the unlucky account is emptied.
Customer fraud, for both credit and debit cards, is also on the rise. Customers intent on this sort of fraud will claim that they lost their card, say that their PIN was written on the card, and then withdraw money from their account using card, and then refuse to be responsible for the loss. The financial industry is well aware of the trends in fraud, and is constantly taking steps to improve the security of the card. However, the linkage between the buyer and his token is tenuous, and that is the fundamental reason behind card fraud today
One possible solution to stolen-card fraud involves placing PIN protection for magnetic stripe credit cards, much as debit cards have PINs today. This will raise the administrative costs for each card, since cardholders will undoubtedly wish to select their own PIN for each of their 3.4 cards. In addition, this solution still doesn't address the problem of counterfeit cards.
Another solution that solves both stolen-card fraud and greatly reduces counterfeit-card fraud involves using a smartcard that includes either a biometric or a PIN. In this approach, authenticated biometrics are recorded from a user of known identity and stored for future reference on a token. In every subsequent access attempt, the user is required to physically enter the requested biometric, which is then compared to the authenticated biometric on the token to determine if the two match in order to verify user identity.
Various biometrics have been suggested, such as fingerprints, hand prints, voice prints, retinal images, handwriting samples and the like. However, because the biometrics are generally stored in electronic (and thus reproducible) form on a token and because the comparison and verification process is not isolated from the hardware and software directly used by the buyer attempting access, a significant risk of fraud still exists. Examples of this approach to system security are described in U.S. Pat. Nos. 4,821,118 to Lafreniere; 4,993,068 to Piosenka et al.; 4,995,086 to Lilley et al.; 5,054,089 to Uchida et al.; 5,095,194 to Barbanell; 5,109,427 to Yang; 5,109,428 to Igaki et al.; 5,144,680 to Kobayashi et al.; 5,146,102 to Higuchi et al.; 5,180,901 to Hiramatsu; 5,210,588 to Lee; 5,210,797 to Usui et al.; 5,222,152 to Fishbine et al.; 5,230,025 to Fishbine et al.; 5,241,606 to Horie; 5,265,162 to Bush et al.; 5,321,242 to Heath, Jr.; 5,325,442 to Knapp; 5,351,303 to Willmore, all of which are incorporated herein by reference.
An example of another token-based biometric smartcard system can be found in U.S. Pat. No. 5,280,527 to Gullman et al. In Gullman's system, the user must carry and present a credit card sized token (referred to as a biometric security apparatus) containing a microchip in which is recorded characteristics of the authorized user's voice. In order to initiate the access procedure, the user must insert the token into a terminal such as an ATM, and then speak into the terminal to provide a biometric sample for comparison with an authenticated sample stored in the microchip of the presented token. If a match is found, the remote terminal signals the host computer that the transaction should be permitted, or may prompt the user for an additional code, such as a PIN which is also stored on the token, before authorizing the transaction.
Although Gullman's reliance of comparison biometrics reduces the risk of unauthorized access as compared to PIN codes, Gullman's use of the token as the repository for the authenticating data combined with Gullman's failure to isolate the identity verification process from the possibility of tampering greatly diminishes any improvement to fraud resistance resulting from the replacement of a numeric code with a biometric. Further, the system remains inconvenient to the consumer because it too requires the presentation of a token in order to authorize a transaction.
Uniformly, the above patents that disclose commercial transaction systems teach away from biometric recognition without the use of tokens. Reasons cited for such teachings range from storage requirements for biometric recognition systems to significant time lapses in identification of a large number of individuals, even for the most powerful computers.
Unfortunately, any smartcard-based system will cost significantly more than the current magnetic stripe card systems currently in place. A PIN smartcard costs perhaps $3, and a biometric smartcard will cost $5. In addition, each point of sale station would need a smartcard reader, and if biometrics are required, a biometric scanner will also have to be attached to the reader as well. With 120 million cardholders and 5 million stations, the initial conversion cost is from two to five times greater than the current annual fraud losses.
This large price tag has forced the industry to look for new ways of using the power in the smartcard in addition to simple commercial transaction. It is envisioned that in addition to storing credit and debit account numbers and biometric or PIN authentication information, smart cards may also store phone numbers, frequent flyer miles, coupons obtained from stores, a transaction history, electronic cash usable at tollbooths and on public transit systems, as well as the buyer's name, vital statistics, and perhaps even medical records.
The net result of "smartening" the token is centralization of function. This looks good during design, but in actual use results in increased vulnerability for the consumer. Given the number of functions that the smartcard will be performing, the loss or damage of this monster card will be excruciatingly inconvenient for the cardholder. Being without such a card will financially incapacitate the cardholder until it is replaced. Additionally, losing a card full of electronic cash will also result in a real financial loss as well.
Thus, after spending vast sums of money, the resulting system will definitely be more secure, but will result in heavier and heavier penalties on the consumer for destruction or loss of the card.
To date, the consumer financial transaction industry has had a simple equation to balance: in order to reduce fraud, the cost of the card must increase. As a result, there has long been a need for a commercial transaction system that is highly fraud-resistant, practical, convenient for the consumer, and yet cost-effective to deploy.
There is also a need for a commercial transaction system that uses a strong link to the person being identified, as opposed to merely verifying a buyer's possession of any physical objects that can be freely transferred. This will result in a dramatic decrease in fraud, as only the buyer can authorize a transaction.
A further need in a commercial transaction system is ensuring consumer convenience by providing authorization without forcing the consumer to possess, carry, and present one or more proprietary objects in order to authorize a transaction. All parties intent on fighting fraud recognize that any system that solves the fraud problem must take the issue of convenience into account, however the fundamental yet unrecognized truth of the situation is, the card itself can be very inconvenient for the consumer. This may not be initially obvious, but anyone who has lost, left at home, or had a card stolen knows well the keenly and immediately-felt inconvenience during the card's absence.
Yet another need in the industry is for a transaction system that greatly reduces or eliminates the need to memorize multiple or cumbersome codes. Such a system must allow a user to access all of his accounts, procure all services to which he is entitled, and carry out transactions in and between all financial accounts, make point of purchase payments, etc.
There is further a need for a commercial transaction system that affords a consumer the ability to alert authorities that a third party is coercing the transaction without the third party being aware that an alert has been generated. There is also a need for a system that is nevertheless able to effect, unknown to the coercing third party, temporary restrictions on the types and amounts of transactions that can be undertaken.
Lastly, such a system must be affordable and flexible enough to be operatively compatible with existing networks having a variety of electronic transaction devices and system configurations.
SUMMARY OF THE INVENTION
The present invention satisfies these needs by providing an improved commercial transaction method between a buyer and a seller using a computer system that comprises the following steps.
First, there is a buyer registration step where a buyer registers a PIN, at least one biometric sample, and at least one buyer financial account. Each financial account has an associated account index code that is assigned by the buyer during registration. The biometric samples, the PIN, the financial accounts, and the index codes are stored in the computer system
Then, the seller is registered in a seller registration step. The seller registers at least one financial account with the computer system, and is given a seller identification code.
Once both buyer and seller are registered, transactions can take place. A seller offers a proposed commercial transaction to a buyer in a proposal step, describing the product or service being sold, the price, and the seller's identification code.
The buyer can then accept the proposed transaction in an acceptance step by adding his buyer's personal authentication information to the commercial transaction proposed by the seller. The authentication information includes the buyer's biometric sample and a PIN. In addition, the buyer must submit his account index code, which specifies which of the buyer's financial accounts to debit. This accepted transaction is called a commercial transaction, which is forwarded to the computer system in a transmission step.
After receiving the commercial transaction, the computer system attempts to identify the buyer. The computer system compares the biometric samples and the PIN added by the buyer to the commercial transaction with previously registered biometric samples and PINs in a buyer identification step. If a match is found, the buyer is identified successfully, otherwise the buyer is not identified and the transaction fails.
Once the buyer is identified, the computer system in a payment step determines the financial account of the buyer using the buyer's account index code as well as the financial account of the seller using the seller identification code, both of which are provided by the commercial transaction. Once both accounts are identified, the computer system debits the account of the buyer and credits the account of the seller. If there are insufficient resources in the buyer's financial account, the transaction fails.
In an alternate embodiment, the computer system constructs a transaction given the buyer and seller financial accounts, the transaction amount, and the associated transaction information, and forwards the transaction to an external computer system, such as one operated by VISA International, where the money transfer occurs and any status of success or failure returned by the external computer system is forwarded by the computer system to the buyer and seller.
When the computer system completes an operation, such as a registration of a buyer or a seller, or a particular transaction succeeds or fails, a presentation step provides the results of the operation to the buyer and/or the seller.
In this manner, commercial transactions are conducted without the buyer having to use any portable man-made memory tokens such as smartcards or magnetic stripe cards.
In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the identification step occurs in less than two seconds, which is a commercially acceptable timeframe.
For situations where the buyer is coerced into making a transaction, an embodiment of the invention provides a mechanism for a buyer to signal that the transaction is being performed under duress. Multiple emergency methods are provided. One method is an emergency account index code which, when employed by the buyer during the acceptance step, allows the transaction to proceed, but in addition sends a silent alarm to the authorities during the payment step. The other method allows the buyer to select an emergency PIN which, when entered during the acceptance step and detected by the computer system during the buyer identification step, results in a successful transaction while at the same time sending a silent alarm.
In both emergency methods, the buyer can specify the steps that the computer system will take or cause to be taken when a silent alarm occurs, including placing artificial financial resource limits on the buyer's accounts, the presentation of false information or financial data, the presentation of a different private code at the end of the transaction, the rejection of the transaction, the notification of the alarm to the authorities, or the notification of the alarm to the seller.
In some situations, it may be possible for people intent on fraud to substitute fake transaction stations for actual transaction stations in order to capture an unsuspecting buyer's biometric and PIN. To counter this, another embodiment of the invention provides a way for the buyer to authenticate the system. During registration, the buyer selects a private code in addition to biometric, PIN, financial accounts, and account index codes. The private code is unrelated to the PIN, and is not used to gain access to the system. The private code is displayed to the buyer at the end of each transaction. Only the computer system and the buyer know the private code, which is never entered by the buyer during the transaction. Since a fake station cannot display the private code to the buyer, any attempt to steal biometric and PIN information is immediately obvious to a buyer.
For some transactions, it is not appropriate to conduct an immediate debit/credit of accounts. These cases include transactions where the exact amount to be transferred is not known at the time of authorization, or when a deposit is reserved by the seller for security reasons that will probably never be collected. As a result, in an alternate embodiment of the invention, the computer system causes a credit authorization draft to be constructed up to the limit supplied in the commercial transaction, instead of executing an immediate debit/credit transaction.
In yet another embodiment of the invention, the computer system communicates with one or more external computer systems in order to perform various functions, including determining if the buyer has sufficient resources, the debiting of a buyer's financial account, the crediting of the seller's financial account, or the construction of a credit authorization draft.
In another embodiment of the invention, the buyer is remote from the seller, and transaction proposals and other information is transmitted from seller to buyer and vice versa using a computer network such as the Internet.
In yet another embodiment of the invention, the seller identification code is identical to the seller's financial account.
In another embodiment of the invention, each account index code has associated with it a name assigned by the account owner during registration. This account name can be displayed during authorization in the event the owner forgets which accounts are available for use.
In most instances, the buyer being identified and the computer system are remote and physically separate from each other.
All electronic communications to and from the computer system are encrypted using industry standard encryption technology, preferably the DES (Data Encryption Standard) with 112-bit encryption keys. Each identification station has its own set of encryption keys that are known only to that particular station and the computer system.
It is preferred that the invention include a method for comparing the biometric samples during registration with a collection of biometric samples from buyers who have been designated as having previously attempted to perpetrate fraud or who have actually perpetrated fraud upon the system, thus eliminating registration of repeat offenders.
Yet another embodiment of the invention creates increased assurance of accurate identification by comparing a buyer's biometric from among a basket of other biometrics, the basket being a subset of all stored biometrics in the system. This is done by first comparing the buyer's biometric with all others in the basket and storing his in that basket only when it is deemed to be sufficiently dissimilar from the other biometrics therein.
In another embodiment of the invention, the buyers choose their own PIN from a group of PINs provided by the computer system. Once the buyer's biometric is gathered, the data processing center selects several PINs at random which may be conducive to being memorized. The computer system then conducts a comparison of the biometric gathered with those already in those PIN baskets. In the event the new registrant's biometric is too similar to any of the registered biometrics currently in the particular PIN basket, that PIN is rejected and an alternative PIN is selected for another such biometric comparison. Once the computer system has generated several PIN options without a confusingly similar biometric, these PINs are presented to the new registrant from which the buyer may select one PIN.
In another embodiment of the invention, in the unlikely event of the theft of biometric information, the situation can be remedied by simply changing the PIN basket in which the person's biometric samples reside. After this is done, the criminal can no longer use the biometric sample to authorize transactions.
The present invention is clearly advantageous over the prior art in a number of ways.
First, it is extremely easy and efficient for the consumer to use because it eliminates the need to carry and present any tokens in order to access one's accounts. The present invention eliminates all the inconveniences associated with carrying, safeguarding, and locating tokens. Further, because tokens are often specific to a particular computer system that further requires remembering a secret PIN code assigned to the particular token, this invention eliminates all such tokens and thereby significantly reduces the amount of memorization and diligence increasingly required of consumers by providing protection and access to all financial accounts using only one personal identification number. The consumer is now uniquely empowered, by means of this invention, to conveniently conduct his personal and/or professional electronic transactions at any time without dependence upon tokens which may be stolen, lost or damaged.
The invention is clearly advantageous from a convenience standpoint to retailers and financial institutions by making purchases and other financial transactions less cumbersome and more spontaneous. The paperwork of financial transactions is significantly reduced as compared to credit card purchases wherein separate receipts are generated and must be retained by the seller and the consumer.
Because the system of the invention is designed to provide a consumer with simultaneous direct access to all of his financial accounts, the need for transactions involving money, checks, credit drafts and the like will be greatly reduced, thereby reducing the cost of equipment and staff required to collect, account, and process such transactions.
Further, the substantial manufacturing and distributing costs of issuing and reissuing all tokens such as credit cards, debit cards, telephone calling cards and the like will be eliminated, thereby providing further economic savings to issuing banks, and ultimately to consumers.
Moreover, the invention is markedly advantageous and superior to existing systems in being highly fraud resistant. As discussed above, present authorization systems are inherently unreliable because they base determination of a user's identity on the physical presentation of a manufactured object along with, in some cases, information that the user knows. Unfortunately, both the token and information can be transferred to another, through loss, theft or by voluntary action of the authorized user. Thus, unless the loss or unintended transfer of these items is realized and reported by the authorized user, anyone possessing such items will be recognized by existing authorization systems as the consumer to whom that token and its corresponding financial accounts are assigned.
By contrast, the present invention virtually eliminates the risk of granting access to unauthorized users by determining identity from an analysis of a user's unique characteristics. Even in the very rare circumstance of coercion, where an authorized buyer is coerced by a coercing party to access his accounts, the system anticipates an emergency account index code, whereby the authorized user can alert authorities of the transgression without the knowledge of the coercing party.
The invention further prevents fraud by storing authentication information and carrying out identity verification operations at a location that is operationally isolated from the user requesting authorization, thereby preventing the user from acquiring copies of the authentication information or from tampering with the verification process. Such a system is clearly superior to existing token-based systems wherein the biometric authentication information are stored on and can be recovered from the token, and wherein the actual identity determination is performed at the same location as the user during the authorization process.
It is an object of the invention therefore to provide a commercial transaction system that eliminates the need for a user to possess and present a physical object, such as a token, in order to authorize a transaction.
It is another object of the invention to provide a commercial transaction system that is capable of verifying a user's identity based on one or more unique characteristics physically personal to the user, as opposed to verifying mere possession of proprietary objects and information.
Yet another object of the invention is to provide a commercial transaction system that is practical, convenient, and easy to use, where buyers no longer need to remember multiple PINs to protect multiple accounts.
Another object of the invention is to provide increased security in a very cost-effective manner, by completely eliminating the need for ever more complicated and expensive tokens.
Still another object of the invention is to provide a commercial transaction system that is highly resistant to fraudulent access attempts by non-authorized users.
Yet another object of the invention is to provide a commercial transaction system that enables a consumer to notify authorities that a particular transaction is being coerced by a third party without giving notice to said third party of the notification.
Another object of the invention is to provide a commercial transaction system that automatically restricts a consumer's transaction capabilities according a desired configuration provided by the user when a transaction is being coerced.
Still another object of the invention is to authenticate the system to the user once the commercial transaction is complete, so the user can detect any attempt by criminals to steal their authentication information.
Another object of the invention is to be added in a simple and cost-effective manner to existing online credit and debit terminals currently installed at points of sale around the world. These and other advantages of the invention will become more fully apparent when the following detailed description of the invention is read in conjunction with the accompanying drawings.
BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS
FIG. 1 is a diagram of the system of the present invention;
FIG. 2 is a diagram of the Data Processing Center (DPC) and its internal databases and execution modules;
FIG. 3 is a diagram of the retail point of sale terminal, the biometric input apparatus and its components, and the interconnections between them;
FIG. 4 is a flow chart of the operation of the biometric input apparatus and the terminal for generating a commercial transaction message;
FIG. 5 is a representational diagram of a sample commercial transaction message;
FIG. 6 is a representational diagram of a sample commercial transaction response message;
FIG. 7 is a flow chart depicting the data encryption and sealing process at the biometric input device;
FIG. 8 is a flow chart depicting the message decryption and seller identification validation at the DPC;
FIG. 9 is a flow chart depicting the data encryption and sealing process at the DPC;
FIG. 10 is a flow chart representing the registration of a buyer during the registration process;
FIG. 11 is a flow chart of the operations performed in order to transmit, execute, and present the results of a commercial transaction message;
FIG. 12 is a flow chart of the biometric identification process at the DPC;
FIG. 13 is a flow chart of the silent alarm process at the DPC;
FIG. 14 is a flow chart of the execution of a transaction by an external computer system;
FIG. 15 is a flow chart of the execution of a transaction by the DPC;
FIG. 16 is a flow chart of the construction of a response message for a given commercial transaction message;
FIG. 17 is a flow chart of the general steps taken during the authorization of a commercial transaction;
FIG. 18 is a flow chart of the general steps taken during the authorization of a commercial transaction in another embodiment.
DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF THE INVENTION
The objective of this invention is to provide a tokenless, secure, reliable, safe, and consistent, method for identifying buyers for the purpose of authorizing financial transactions for large numbers of consumers. It is the essence of this invention that consumers have the ability to conduct these transactions without the use of any tokens, credit cards, badges or identification cards including drivers licenses. In order to be functional it is important that the system operate at speeds similar to those currently in operation for completing financial transactions such as credit card purchases and ATM services. The system must be secure, such that buyers' records and their biometric information remain confidential and safe, both within the computer system that identifies the buyer and authorizes transactions, as well as during collection and transfer of authentication information between the computer system and the remote sites with which the computer system communicates.
Furthermore, the system must be reliable in that errors in identification and authorization must be infrequent and not hamper or make use of the system cumbersome. Since only the use of biometrics are contemplated for identification of buyers, the system must also have security measures during emergency cases to either reduce access, even to the authorized user, as well as notify authorities. It is appreciated that the system must be able to handle a large number of users, and accommodate storage and transfer of large amounts of data, such as biometric information, commensurate with speeds at which financial transactions are carried on today.
Turning now to the figures, the overall configuration of the invention and its components are shown in FIG. 1. Essentially a Data Processing Center (DPC) 1 is connected to various terminals 2 through various types of communication means 3. The DPC is also connected and communicates with independent computer networks 4. The DPC contains several databases and software execution modules as shown in FIG. 2. In a preferred embodiment of the invention, the databases are backed up or "mirrored" in distinct physical locations for safety reasons. The Firewall Machine 5 is responsible for prevention of electronic intrusion of the system while the Gateway Machine 6 is responsible for routing all requests from the user, including adding, deleting and otherwise modifying all databases. The Gateway Machine is also responsible for decryption and de-packaging of data that has arrived from the terminals using the MACM module 7, MDM module 8, and the SNM module 9. The PGL module 10, and the IML module 11 are used to locate the proper PIN code and biometric basket. FIG. 3 depicts an example of a terminal 2 and the biometric input device 12, which has a biometric scanner 13, data entry means such as a key pad or PIN pad 14, and a display panel 15. The biometric scanner can be any one of fingerprint scanner, voice input device (microphone), palm print scanner, retinal scanner or the like, although the fingerprint scanner will be used as an example. The biometric input device is further equipped with computing modules 16, device drivers, and erasable and non-erasable memory modules. The biometric input device communicates with the terminal through preferably a serial port 17. The terminal 2 communicates through a modem 18 with the DPC 1 through messages 19 and responses 20 using one of the interconnecting means in FIG. 1 such as a cable TV network, cellular telephone network, telephone network, the Internet, or an X.25 network. FIG. 4 shows a representational diagram of the commercial transaction message 19 and its method of generation by the biometric input device software. FIG. 5 and FIG. 6 show a representational diagram of the commercial transaction message and response message. Furthermore, it is shown which parts of the messages are encrypted and which ones are sealed. FIG. 7 is a block diagram of the overall process for data encryption and sealing showing the use of DUKPT key data 20 for encryption of data before appending additional data before sealing the message with a Message Authentication Code (MAC) 21. FIG. 8 and FIG. 9 show the encryption and decryption process at the DPC. FIG. 10 shows the steps taken during the registration of a new buyer. FIG. 11 describes the steps involved in processing a commercial transaction message, starting from its formation at the BIA, all processing by the DPC, and then finally the presentation of results by the BIA. FIG. 12 describes the biometric ID process at the DPC. FIG. 13 describes the processing of silent alarms at the DPC. FIG. 14 and 15 describe the processing required to determine resources of a buyer and execute payment from a buyer to a seller, both internally to the DPC as well as externally via an external computer system. FIG. 16 describes how the DPC constructs a response to a particular commercial transaction. FIG. 17 and FIG. 18 are a description on the steps taken to process a commercial transaction, from proposal through presentation of results.
Description of the drawings, diagrams, flow charts and the description of the invention, including hardware components, software components, execution modules, databases, connection means, the data transferred between them, and the method of the invention is described in detail as follows.
1.1. Biometric Input Apparatus (BIA)
1.1.1. Introduction
The BIA is a combination of hardware and software whose job is to gather, encode, and encrypt biometric input for use in commercial transaction. All actions of the BIA are directed by an outside controlling entity called a terminal, which issues commands and receives results over the BIA's serial line.
BIA hardware comes in four basic versions: standard, wireless, and integrated phone/cable television (or "CATV"). Each BIA hardware variant addresses a particular need in the marketplace. Based on the differences in construction, BIAs vary in their abilities to resist fraud, and so each BIA has a device security assessment value which is set for each BIA of that model type.
BIA software comes in seven basic versions: personal computer (or "PC"), retail, registration, internal, issuer, and integrated remote. Each software load provides a different, use-specific command set. For instance, the registration software load does not accept requests to form retail transaction messages. Likewise, the retail software command set cannot send buyer registration messages. To provide another layer of security, the DPC knows what software package is loaded into each BIA; any attempts by a BIA to send a message that it is normally not able to send is rejected by the DPC and the event is treated as a major security violation.
The ability of the invention to detect and combat seller-based fraud relies on the fact that the BIA's external interface is strictly limited, that the construction of the BIA makes it extremely difficult to tamper with the contents, that each BIA has its unique encryption codes that are known only to the DPC, and that each BIA is only allowed to perform operations limited to its designated function. Each biometric input means has a hardware identification code previously registered with the DPC, which makes the biometric input means uniquely identifiable to the DPC in each subsequent transmission from that biometric input device.
The BIA is constructed with the assumption that the controlling terminal is a source for fraud and deception. Terminals range from software applications running on personal computers to dedicated hardware/software systems developed for a particular use such as a retail point of sale. Regardless of the particular model, no BIA reveals unencrypted biometric information. BIA models without display means (such as LCD or LED screens) must reveal selected information (such as private codes) to the terminal for display, and as a result those particular terminal-BIA combinations are considered to be less secure.
Depending on the task at hand, BIA models are either partially or fully integrated with the terminal. Partially integrated devices are physically separate from the terminal, and they include wireless and standard retail point of sale BIAs. Fully integrated devices are contained within the physical enclosure of the terminal itself, for instance a telephone.
No BIA ever discloses any secret encryption codes to any external source.
1.1.2. BIA Models
Particular BIA hardware models have different configurations. They are introduced in brief here:
BIA
Standard model has computing module, biometric scanner, display means, communications port, data entry means encased in tamper-resistant case, and electronic detection means.
BIA/Wireless
Standard model, but serial line replaced with a wireless communications module using external antenna. Used in restaurant point of sale.
BIA/Catv
Has a light-duty scanner and serial port, along with a multichip module. The fact that the display is part of the terminal and not the BIA means lower security because it must reveal the private code to the terminal. Used in telephones and CATV remotes. Weakest security, both because the display and PIN pad are part of the terminal not the BIA, and because of the low-cost nature of the market.
1.1.3. BIA Command Set Messages
Each BIA software command set provides a different set of operations. They are introduced briefly here:
BIA/Catv
Remote Commercial Transaction
List Accounts
BIA/Internal
Buyer Identification
BIA/Issuer
Issuer Batch
BIA/PC
Remote Commercial Transaction
List Accounts
BIA/Registration
Buyer Identification
Buyer Registration
List Accounts
BIA/Retail
Commercial Transaction
List Accounts
1.1.4. BIA Hardware: Standard Model
The Standard BIA hardware is a multichip module combined with a single-print scanner, a display screen, a serial port, and a PIN pad encased in a hard tamper-resistant case that makes attempts to penetrate obvious while also providing RF shielding for the contents. The following components are amalgamated into a multichip module, called the BIA Multichip Module (a process for encapsulating several processors in one physical shell, well known in the industry), constructed to protect the communications pathways between the devices from easy wiretapping.
Serial processor
PIN pad processor
LCD screen processor
CCD scanner
A/D processor
High-speed DSP processor containing both flash and mask ROM
General-purpose microprocessor
Standard RAM
EEPROM
The following software packages and data are stored in mask ROM. Mask ROM is cheaper than other types of read only memory, but it is easily reverse engineered, and is not electronically erasable. As such only the noncritical commonly available code are placed here.
MAC calculation library
DUKPT Key Management library
DES (with CBC) Encryption library
Base-64 (8-bit to printable ASCII) converter library
Public Key Encryption library
Embedded Operating System
Serial line device driver
LCD device driver
PIN pad device driver
Scanner device driver
Unique hardware identification code
Multi-Language profiles The following standard data and software packages are stored in flash ROM. Flash ROM is more expensive, but it is much more difficult to reverse engineer, and most importantly, it is electronically erasable. All of the more critical information is stored here. Flash ROM is used in an attempt to increase the difficulty of duplicating a BIA.
Unique DUKPT Future Key Table
Unique 112-bit MAC Key
DSP biometric quality determination algorithm
DSP biometric encoding algorithm
Random number generator algorithm
Command function table
The message sequence number, incremented each time a message is sent from the BIA, is stored in the EEPROM. EEPROM can be erased many times, but is also nonvolatile--its contents remain valid across power interruptions
The following data is stored in RAM. RAM is temporary in nature, and its contents are lost whenever power is lost.
Encoded Biometric Register
PIN Register
Account Index Code Register
Amount Register
PIN-Block Key
Message Key
Response Key
8 General Registers
stack and heap space Each multichip module contains a "write-once" memory location that is irreversibly set following the initialization of the flash ROM. Whenever an attempt is made to download software to the flash ROM, this memory location is checked; if it is already been set, then the BIA refuses to load. This way, critical software and data keys may only be downloaded once into the device, at the time of manufacture.
All registers and keys are explicitly cleared when a transaction is canceled. Once a transaction is completed, registers are cleared as well. Once a "form message" command is executed, biometric, PIN, and account index code registers are also cleared, along with any encryption keys that aren't required for subsequent use.
It is important that the software not keep copies of registers or keys in stack variables.
the following associated hardware components comprise the standard BIA hardware module.
BIA Multichip module
CCD single-print scanner
capacitance detector plate (known in the industry)
lighted PIN keypad with auxiliary buttons
2-line 40-column LCD screen
RF shielding
tamper-resistant case
serial connection (up to 57.6 kb)
breech detection hardware (known in the industry)
optional thermite charge attached to Multichip module (known in the industry)
All temporary storage and internal hardware and software used to calculate these values are secured, which means they resist any attempt to determine their current values, or their means of functioning. This feature is essential for the security of the invention, just as it is critical that the "wiretapping" of a BIA and specifically the gathering of a Biometric-PIN Block for fraudulent means is made as difficult as possible.
The multichip module and the components are physically connected to each other without exposed wiring.
The enclosure protecting the electronic components of the BIA is welded shut during manufacture; it cannot be opened under any circumstances without significant damage to the case. Upon detecting any opening (or damage) of the enclosure, the BIA performs an emergency electronic zero of any and all keys residing in flash ROM, followed by all of the software libraries. Specific breech detection methods are kept confidential and proprietary.
In addition to protecting the contents, the case also shields the internal operations from RF signal detectors.
Supersecure versions of the BIA exist whereby breech detection methods are connected to a mechanism that physically destroys the multichip module as well as the detection methods themselves.
Auxiliary buttons are used to specify particular operations, such as the list accounts operation, or the help operation, to display information that is not generally associated with a transaction.
1.1.5. BIA Hardware: Wireless Model
The Wireless version of BIA hardware is identical to the Standard model in construction, except that it communicates with the terminal using a spread-spectrum wireless communications module instead of a standard serial port.
This version is designed to be used in locations such as restaurants, where transactions are authorized at the buyer's convenience.
This device contains no Serial Port, however it does have an external antenna, and a spread-spectrum wireless serial transmission unit for communicating with the remote cash register Terminal.
1.1.6. BIA Hardware: Phone/CATV Model
The Phone/CATV version of BIA hardware is a multichip module combined with a single-print scanner and a serial port. The module is physically attached to the scanner, and the whole is encased in plastic in order to make tampering more difficult. Some amount of RF shielding is provided for the components.
This version is designed to be integrated with telephones and television remote controls. As a result, it makes use of the existing keypads and LCD or television screens to enter or display values, rather than having its own display and keypad entry device. It also uses the communication facilities of the host terminal. For example, the television remote uses the CATV cable network to send its signals to the DPC.
This hardware model is (in comparison with other models) relatively insecure, as it is intended that these devices cost as little as possible, be lightweight, and integrate easily with existing low-cost devices.
Of course, higher-security versions with more complete enclosures are possible and encouraged.
1.2. BIA Software
1.2.1. BIA Software Command Interface
The external interface to the BIA is much like a standard modem; commands are sent to it from a controlling terminal using the external serial line. When a command completes, a response code is sent from the BIA to the terminal. The particulars of the BIA software command interface detailed below illustrate one particular embodiment; other embodiments may mimic popular PIN pad interfaces, such as those manufactured by Verifone, Inc.
Each BIA software load supports a different set of operations. For instance, a retail load supports only commercial transactions, while a registration load supports buyer identification and buyer registration.
All BIA data fields are in printable ASCII, with fields separated by field separator control characters, and records separated by newlines. Encrypted fields are binary converted to 64-bit ASCII using the base-64 conversion library (all known in the industry).
Both the personal ID code and the account index code can be one or more alphanumeric characters, which includes numbers, letters, and other characters. For foreign languages, this includes multiple-character combinations which are used to represent specific words or concepts in that language, such as kanji characters. For BIAs that just have a ten-digit keypad, the codes will simply be numbers as in a standard PIN code, though people may choose to use the standard telephone keypad alphabetic-to-keypad-number translations (e.g. ABC=1, DEF=2, etc.) to help them remember their codes.
1.2.1.1 Response Codes:
Out of time:
The time allotted for the command has expired. A message to that effect will be displayed on the LCD screen, if available. When time expires for a given command, the BIA acts as if the cancel button was pushed.
Canceled:
The "cancel" button has been pushed, and the entire operation has been canceled. This has the side effect of clearing all information which was gathered. A message to that effect will be displayed on the LCD screen, if available.
OK:
The command was successful.
Other:
Each command may have specific other response codes which are valid only for it. These response codes will generally have text accompanying the code, which will be displayed on the LCD screen if it is available.
Message:
This indicates that the command is ongoing, but that the BIA wants to send a message to the terminal with an interim result message. The result is also displayed on the LCD, if available. This facility is used for prompts, as well as status messages.
1.2.1.2 Commands
In the argument list of the commands below, the <> characters surround individual arguments, ›! characters surround optional arguments, and the .vertline. character indicates that a given argument may be comprised of one of the choices presented.
Set Language <language-name>
This command selects from one of a number of different languages encoded within the BIA for prompting for user input.
Get Biometric <time> ›primary.vertline.secondary!
This command requests the BIA to activate its scanner to get biometric input from the buyer, storing it into the Encoded Biometric Register.
First, the message "Please place finger on lighted panel" is displayed on the LCD panel and returned to the terminal. The scanner pad is illuminated, prompting the buyer to enter his biometric.
A <time> value of zero means that there is no limit to the time for biometric scan input.
When in scanning mode, a fingerprint scan is taken and given a preliminary analysis by the print quality algorithm. If the scan is not good enough, the BIA continues to take new scans until <time> seconds pass. As time passes and snapshots of the print are taken and analyzed, messages are posted to the LCD screen and sent to the terminal based on the problems detected by the print quality software. If no print of appropriate quality is forthcoming, the BIA returns an error code of time expired, displaying a message to that effect on the LCD.
Once the print quality algorithm affirms the quality of the print scan, the print's minutiae are then extracted by the print encoding algorithm. Only a subset of the minutiae are selected at random, with care taken to retain enough sufficient for identification. These minutiae are then ordered randomly, and are placed in the Encoded Biometric Register, producing a bid biometric sample. Then the BIA responds with the success result code.
If the ›primary.vertline.secondary! is specified (only available in the buyer registration command set) then the entire minutiae set is selected, not just the smaller subset, producing a registration biometric sample. Likewise, primary/secondary biometric selection ends up placing the encoded biometric into the appropriate register.
Whether or not the operation succeeds, as soon as scanning has terminated, the light indicating that scanning is in progress is turned off.
It is important that the same biometric input yields different encodings, so as to complicate the task of anyone attempting to discover the encryption codes of a captured BIA. This is accomplished by the selection of a random subset or random ordering of the encoded biometric, although other methods are possible.
Get PIN <time>
This command requests the BIA to fill the PIN Register by reading from the keypad.
First, the message "Please enter your PIN, then press <enter>" is displayed on the LCD display and sent to the terminal, the appropriate keypad lights are turned on, and then keypad scanning begins.
Scanning terminates when either <time> number of seconds runs out, or when the buyer hits the "enter" key.
Note that the digits of the PIN are not displayed on the LCD panel, but for each digit the buyer types, a star "*" appears to give the buyer feedback. When the "correction" key is pressed, the last digit entered is erased, allowing the buyer to fix input mistakes.
When PIN input terminates, the keypad lights turns off.
If successful, the command returns OK.
Get Account Index Code <time>
First, the message "Now enter your account index code, then press <enter>" is displayed on the LCD and sent to the terminal. This prompts the buyer to enter his account index code. When each key is pressed, that value appears on the LCD panel. The correction button can be pressed to erase one of the values. When the "enter" button is pressed, the Account index code register is set.
During input, the appropriate keypad keys are lit, and when input is concluded, the keypad lights are turned off.
If successful, the command returns OK.
Validate Amount <amount> <time>
The Validate Amount command sends the message "Amount <amount> OK?" to the terminal, and displays it on the LCD screen. If the buyer confirms the amount by hitting the "yes" (or enter) button, the Amount Register is set to <amount>. The <amount> value must be a valid number, with no control characters or spaces, etc. During prompting, the yes, no, and cancel buttons are lit. Once prompting is complete, all the lights are turned off. This amount, along with the currency, forms the price information on a commercial transaction.
If the buyer enters "no", then the transaction is canceled.
Enter Amount <time>
The Enter Amount command sends the message "Enter amount" to the terminal, and also displays it on the LCD screen as well. The buyer must then enter the dollar amount himself. Each character entered is displayed on the LCD screen. All appropriate buttons are lit. If the enter button is hit, the Amount Register is set to be the value entered on the keyboard. Once entry is complete, all the lights are turned off.
This can be used for transactions where the buyer wishes to enter the total amount he will pay, perhaps as a result of a combination of a purchase with cash-back.
Assign Register <register> <text>
The assign register command sets the designated General <register> to have the value <text>. This is used to set information such as the seller identification code, the product information, and so on.
Get Message Key
The Get Message Key command causes the BIA to generate a 112-bit random key to be used by the controlling hardware to encrypt any message body that the controlling device wishes to add to the message. That generated key is returned by the BIA in hexadecimal format (known in the industry). The message key are then added to the biometric-PIN block.
Form Message <(type=buyer identification.vertline.commercial transaction . . . >
The form message command instructs the BIA to output a message containing all the information it has gathered. It also checks to make sure that all the registers appropriate to that specific message <type> have been set. If all required registers are not set, the BIA returns with an error. The specific command set software will determine which messages can be formed by that BIA model; all others will be rejected.
Each message includes a transmission code consisting of the BIA's unique hardware identification code and an incrementing sequence number. The transmission code allows the DPC to identify the sending BIA and to detect resubmission attacks.
The BIA uses the DUKPT key management system to select the biometric-PIN block encryption 112-bit DES key from the Future Key Table. This key is then used to encrypt the Biometric-PIN Block using cipher block chaining (CBC). In addition, a response DES key is also generated randomly, and is used by the DPC to encrypt the portions of the response that need to be encrypted.
Splitting the response key from the biometric-PIN block key is very important, since each encryption key must be used only within the context of its own responsibilities. That way, if someone were to break the key encoding the private code, it would not result in the disclosure of the biometric-PIN. All personal authentication information (the biometric and PIN) is stored within the biometric-PIN block.
The Biometric-PIN block consists of the following fields:
300-byte authorization biometric
4-12 digit PIN
112-bit response key
›optional 112-bit message key!
Note that the message key is only present if the controlling terminal has requested a message key for this message. It is up to the controlling terminal to encrypt any message body attached to the commercial transaction message using the message key.
Once all encryption is complete, the BIA outputs the body of the appropriate request message (such as a Commercial Transaction message), terminated by and protected with the Message Authentication Code (MAC).
The MAC field is calculated using the BIA's secret 112-bit DES MAC key, and covers all message fields from first to last. The MAC assures the DPC that nothing in the message has changed effectively sealing the message, while still allowing the plaintext fields to be inspected by the controlling terminal.
When the Form Message command is done, the BIA sends the message "I'm talking to DPC Central" to the terminal as well as displaying it on the LCD screen, indicating that work is proceeding on the request.
The command returns OK in addition to returning the entire formed message upon completion of the command.
Show Response <encrypted response> <time>
The Show Response command instructs the BIA to use its current Response Key to decrypt the response from the system.
After decryption, a chime sounds or the PIN pad light flashes, and the private code is displayed on the LCD screen for <time> seconds. At no time does this command transmit the decrypted private code to the controlling terminal.
Any other information located in the response message is returned to the terminal, such as an authorization code that is returned from a credit authorization. Thus, existing systems that require two-step transactions can be accommodated.
Reset
The Reset command instructs the BIA to clear all temporary registers, the LCD screen, all temporary Key registers, and to turn off all keypad lights that may be on.
Set PIN <value>
This command assigns the BIA's PIN Register to be <value>.
Note that allowing a non-secured device to provide the PIN is a potential security problem, because non-secured devices are much more vulnerable to wiretapping or replacement.
Set Account index code <value>
This command assigns the BIA's Account index code Register to be <value>.
Note that allowing a non-secured device to provide the account index code is a potential security problem, because non-secured devices are much more vulnerable to wiretapping or replacement.
Set Amount <value>
This command assigns the BIA's Amount Register to be <value>.
Decrypt Response <encrypted response message>
The Decrypt Response command instructs the BIA to use its current Response Key to decrypt the encrypted portion of the response message. Once decrypted, the response is returned to the controlling device, presumably for display on the terminal's LED screen.
Note that providing this decryption ability is a security problem, as once the plaintext leaves the BIA, the terminal has the ability to do with it what it will.
1.2.2. BIA Software: Support Libraries
The BIA software is supported by several different software libraries. Some of them are standard, generally available libraries, but some have special requirements in the context of the BIA.
1.2.2.1. Random Number Generator
Since the BIA is constantly selecting random DES keys for use in the message body and message response encryption, it is important that the keys selected be unpredictable keys. If the random number generator is based on time of day, or on some other externally-predictable mechanism, then the encryption keys will be much more easily guessed by an adversary that happens to know the algorithm. The security of the encryption techniques used in the BIA assumes that both the random number generator algorithm as well as the encryption algorithms are both publicly known.
One such random number algorithm for generating DES keys is defined in ANSI X9.17, appendix C.
1.2.2.2. DSP Biometric Encoding Algorithms
The biometric encoding algorithm is a proprietary algorithm for locating the minutiae that are formed by ridge endings and bifurcations on human fingertips. A complete list of minutiae is stored in the DPC as a reference, while only a partial list is required by the algorithm when performing a comparison between an identification candidate and a registered buyer.
During both registration as well as identification, the encoding algorithm must find a reasonable number of minutiae points. Otherwise, the BIA will ask for the biometric to be re-entered.
1.2.2.3. Operating System and Device Drivers
The BIA is a real-time computing environment, and as such requires a real-time embedded operating system to run it. The operating system is responsible for taking interrupts from devices and scheduling tasks.
Each device driver is responsible for the interface between the operating system and the specific hardware, such as the PIN pad device driver, or the CCD Scanner device driver. Hardware is the source for events such as "PIN pad key pressed," or "CCD Scanner scan complete". The device driver handles such interrupts, interprets the events, and then takes action on the events.
1.2.2.4. DES Encryption Library
There are any number of DES implementations publicly available. DES implementations provide a secret key-based encryption from plaintext to ciphertext, and decryption from ciphertext to plaintext, using 112-bit secret keys.
1.2.2.5. Public Key Encryption Library
Public Key encryption support libraries are available from Public Key Partners, holders of the RSA public key patent (known in the industry). Public Key cryptosystems are asymmetric encryption systems that allow communication to take place without requiring a costly exchange of secret keys. To use a public key encryption system, a public key is used to encrypt a DES key, and then the DES key is used to encrypt a message. The BIA uses public key cryptosystems to provide for the secure exchange of secret keys.
1.2.2.6. DUKPT Key Management Library
The derived unique key per transaction key (DUKPT) management library is used to create future DES keys given an initial key and a message sequence number. Future keys are stored in a Future Key Table. Once used, a given key is cleared from the table. Initial keys are only used to generate the initial future key table. Therefore the initial key is not stored by the BIA
The use of DUKPT is designed to create a key management mechanism that provided a different DES key for each transaction, without leaving behind the trace of the initial key. The implications of this are that even successful capture and dissection of a given future key table does not reveal messages that were previously sent, a very important goal when the effective lifetime of the information transmitted is decades. DUKPT is fully specified in ANSI X9.24.
DUKPT was originally developed to support PIN encryption mechanisms for debit card transactions. In this environment, it was critical to protect all transactions. An assumption is made that a criminal records encrypted transactions for a six month period, and then captures and successfully extracts the encryption code from the PIN pad. The criminal could then manufacture one new counterfeit debit card for each card used during that six month period.
Under DUKPT, however, the criminal's theft and reverse engineering would not allow him to decrypt previous messages, although new messages would still be decryptable if the criminal were to replace the PIN pad subsequent to reverse engineering.
In the biometric-PIN situation, the criminal has an even harder time, as even if messages are decrypted, turning a digital biometric-PIN into a physical fingerprint is much harder than turning an account number-PIN into a plastic card, which is one of the significant benefits of the tokenless system.
Still, if a criminal can decrypt, he can encrypt, which might allow him to electronically submit a biometric-PIN to the system to authorize a fraudulent transaction. While this is quite difficult, it is still best to restrict the options available to the criminal as much as possible, hence the use of DUKPT.
1.3. BIA Software Command Sets
1.3.1. BIA Software: Retail Command Set
The BIA/Retail software interface exports an interface that allows specific retail point of sale terminals to interact with the system.
The BIA/Retail interface is designed to allow the terminal to perform the following operation:
Commercial Transaction
List Accounts
In order to implement those operations, the BIA/Retail provides the following command set:
Set Language <language-name>
Get Biometric <time>
Get PIN <time>
Assign Register <register> <value>
Get Account index code <time>
Validate Amount <amount> <time>
Enter Amount <time>
Form Message <type>
Show Response <encrypted response> <time>
Reset
1.3.2. BIA Software: CATV (Integrated Remote) Command Set
The BIA/CATV software interface exports a command set that allows terminals integrated with a Phone/CATV BIAs to interact with the system. The following operation is supported:
Remote Commercial Transaction
List Accounts
In order to implement that operation, the BIA/CATV provides the following command set:
Get Biometric <time>
Set PIN <text>
Assign Register <register> <text>
Set Account index code <text>
Form Message <type>
Decrypt Response <encrypted response message>
Reset
1.3.3. BIA Software: Registration Command Set
The BIA/Reg software interface exports an interface that allows general-purpose computers to interact with the system to identify and register buyers. The following operations are supported:
Buyer Identification
Buyer Registration
List Accounts
In order to support those operations, the BIA/Reg provides the following command set:
Set Language <language-name>
Get Biometric <time> ›primary.vertline.secondary!
Get PIN <time>
Assign Register <register> <text>
Get Message Key
Form Message <type>
Show Response <encrypted response> <time>
Reset
1.3.4. BIA Software: PC Command Set
The BIA/PC software interface exports a command set that allows general-purpose computers to conduct transactions across the network. The following operations are supported:
Remote Commercial Transaction
List Accounts
In order to support those operations, the BIA/PC provides the following command set:
Set Language <language-name>
Get Biometric <time>
Get PIN <time>
Get Account index code <time>
Validate Amount <amount> <time>
Enter Amount <time>
Assign Register <register> <text>
Get Message Key
Form Message <type>
Show Response <encrypted response> <time>
Reset
1.3.5. BIA Software: Issuer Command Set
The BIA/Iss software interface exports an interface that allows general-purpose computers to interact with the system to authenticate and submit batch change requests. The following operation is supported:
Issuer Batch
In order to implement this operation, the BIA/Iss provides the following command set:
Set Language <language-name>
Get Biometric <time> ›primary.vertline.secondary!
Get PIN <time>
Assign Register <register> <value>
Get Message Key
Form Message <type>
Show Response <encrypted response> <time>
Reset
1.3.7. BIA Software: internal Command Set
The BIA/Int exports a command set that allows general-purpose computers to interact with the system to identify people for purposes of customer support terminals. The following operation is supported:
Buyer Identification
In order to implement this operation, the BIA/Int provides the following command set:
Set Language <language-name>
Get Biometric <time>
Get PIN <time>
Assign Register <register> <value>
Get Message Key
Form Message <type>
Show Response <encrypted response> <time>
Reset
1.4. Terminals
1.4.1. Introduction
The terminal is the device that controls the BIA and connects to the DPC via modem, X.25 packet network, telephone network, the Internet, a private intranet, or even a Cable TV network, or some other mechanism for digital networking that is well-known in the industry. Terminals come in different shapes and sizes, and require different versions of the BIA to perform their tasks. Any electronic device that can issue commands to and receive results from the biometric input device is considered to be a terminal.
Some terminals are application programs that run on a general-purpose microcomputer, while other terminals are combinations of special-purpose hardware and software as show in FIG. 1.
While the terminal is critical for the functioning of the system as a whole, the system itself places no trust in the terminal whatsoever. Whenever a terminal provides information to the system, the system always validates it in some manner, either through presentation to the buyer for confirmation, or by cross-checking through other previously registered information.
While terminals are able to read some parts of BIA messages in order to validate that the data was processed properly by the BIA, terminals cannot read biometric identification information including the biometric, the PIN, encryption keys, or account index codes.
Specific BIAs export some security functionality to the terminal, such as PIN entry, and private code display. As a result, such devices are regarded as somewhat less secure than their entirely self-contained counterparts, and as such have consequently lower security ratings.
There are many different terminal types; each is connected to a specific model BIA. Each terminal is described in brief below:
BRT (Buyer Registration Terminal)
Standard BIA with Registration software load attached to a microcomputer provides issuers with the ability to register new buyers with the system along with their financial accounts and other personal information.
CPT (Cable-TV Point of Sale Terminal)
BIA/catv with CATV software load attached to the CATV broadband provides buyers with biometric-television (or "TV") remotes with the ability to authorize television shopping purchases.
CST (Customer Service Terminal)
Standard BIA with Internal software load attached to a microcomputer system authorizes employees to construct database requests for the purposes of customer service.
IPT (Internet Point of Sale Terminal)
Standard BIA with personal computer software load attached to a microcomputer provides buyers with Internet connections the ability to purchase products from a seller that is connected to the Internet.
IT (Issuer Terminal)
Standard BIA with Issuer software load attached to a microcomputer provides issuerss with the ability to send batched changes of financial accounts to the DPC.
PPT (Phone Point of Sale Terminal)
BIA/catv with CATV software load integrated with a telephone provides buyers with the ability to authorize transactions over the telephone.
RPT (Retail Point of Sale Terminal)
Standard BIA with Retail software load attached to an X.25 network or using a modem allows a buyer to purchase items using commercial transactions in a store.
1.4.2. Terminal: Retail Point of Sale Terminal
1.4.2.1. Purpose
The purpose of the RPT is to allow buyers to purchase items at a store without having to use either cash, check, or a debit or credit card.
The RPT uses a BIA/Retail to authorize financial transactions from a buyer to a seller. In addition to being used to accept biometric-PIN authorizations, the RPT provides standard debit and credit card scanning functions as well.
Note that only the biometric-related transactions are described in detail here. It is assumed that the RPT may also consist of standard credit and debit magnetic stripe card readers, as well as optional smart card readers too. An example of a RPT is a Verifone Tranz/330.
1.4.2.2. Construction
Each RPT is connected to the DPC by a modem, an X.25 network connection, an ISDN connection, or similar mechanism. The RPT may also be connected to other devices, such as an electronic cash register, from which it obtains the amount of the transaction and the seller identification code.
The RPT consists of:
a BIA/Retail
an inexpensive microprocessor
modem or network interface hardware
seller identification code number in non-volatile RAM
a serial port for connecting to the BIA
magnetic stripe card reader (known in the industry)
ECR (electronic cash register) connection port
optional smart card reader (known in the industry)
1.4.2.3. Identification
Two entities need to be identified for the DPC to respond positively to a BIA commercial transaction message: the buyer and the seller.
The buyer is identified by the biometric-PIN, and the seller is identified by the DPC, which cross-checks the seller identification code contained in the BIA's VAD record with the seller identification code added to the transaction request by the RPT.
1.4.2.4. Operation
First, the seller enters the value of the transaction into his electronic cash register. This information is communicated to the BIA, along with the list of goods or services, date and time, any invoice numbers, the location, and the seller identification code. This represents the proposed commercial transaction. If the buyer approves, he either enters the amount or validates the amount, possibly asking for cash back, and then enters his biometric-PIN as well as his account index code. When the buyer completes his approval, the RPT instructs the BIA to construct the commercial transaction, and then sends the commercial transaction to the DPC through its network connection (modem, X.25, etc.).
When the DPC receives the transaction, it validates the biometric-PIN, obtains the account number using the index code, and cross-checks the seller identification code in the message with the registered owner of the BIA. If everything checks out, the DPC forms and sends a credit/debit transaction to execute the exchange, assuming the commercial transaction is to happen immediately. The response from the credit/debit network is added to the private code to form the transaction response message, which the DPC then sends back to the RPT. The RPT examines the response to see whether or not the transaction succeeded, and then forwards the response to the BIA, which then displays the buyer's private code, concluding the transaction.
1.4.2.5. Security
Messages between the RPT and the DPC are secured by encryption and MAC calculation from the BIA. The MAC allows the RPT to review the unencrypted parts of the message, but the RPT cannot change them. Encryption prevents the encrypted part of the message from being disclosed to the RPT.
Each retail BIA must be registered to a seller. This helps to discourage BIA theft. Furthermore, because the RPT adds the seller identification code onto each message, replacing a seller's BIA with a different BIA is detected by the cross-check performed at the DPC.
1.4.3. Terminal: Internet Point of Sale Terminal
1.4.3.1. Purpose
The purpose of an Internet Point of sale Terminal (IPT) is to authorize credit and debit financial transactions from a buyer at a computer to a seller, both of whom are on the Internet.
Note that the Internet simply represents a general-purpose network where a seller, the DPC, and the IPT can all connect to each other in real time. As a result, this mechanism would work exactly the same on any other general-purpose network or collection of interconnected general-purpose networks.
1.4.3.2. Construction
The IPT consists of:
a BIA/PC
a microcomputer
an Internet Shopper software application
an Internet (or other network) connection
1.4.3.3. Identification
In addition to identifying the buyer, the IPT must also identify the remote seller who is the counterparty to the transaction. The seller must also identify both the DPC and the IPT.
The Internet Shopper program stores the hostname (or other form of net name) of the seller from which the purchase is taking place so that the DPC can verify the seller's identity. This is called the seller's identification channel. Since the seller registers all of his legitimate Internet hosts with the DPC, this allows the DPC to cross-check the seller identification code with the seller identification code stored under that hostname to verify the seller's identity.
1.4.3.4. Operation
First, the IPT connects to the seller using the Internet. Once a connection is established, the IPT secures it by generating and then sending a Session Key to the seller. In order to assure that the session key is protected from disclosure, it is encrypted with the seller's Public Key using Public Key Encryption. When the seller receives this encrypted Session Key, he decrypts it using his Private Key. This process is called securing a connection through a Public Key Encrypted secret key exchange.
Once connected, the IPT downloads the seller identification code, and both price and product information from the seller. Once the buyer is ready to make a purchase, he selects the merchandise he wishes to buy. Then, the buyer enters the biometric-PIN using the BIA/PC, the IPT sends the seller identification code, the product identification information, and the amount to the BIA, and instructs it to construct a Remote Commercial Transaction message. Then the IPT sends the request to the seller via the secure channel.
The seller is connected to the DPC via the same sort of secure connection that the IPT has with the seller, namely, using Public Key Encryption to send a secure session key. Unlike the IPT-seller connection, however, seller-DPC session keys are good for an entire day, not for just one connection.
The seller connects to the DPC, securing the connection using the session key, forwarding the transaction to the DPC for validation. The DPC validates the biometric-PIN, cross-checks the seller identification code contained in the request with the seller identification code stored under the hostname that was sent in the request, and then sends a transaction to the credit/debit network. Once the credit/debit network responds, the DPC constructs a response message including the credit/debit authorization, an encrypted private code, and the address of the buyer, and sends that message back to the seller.
Once the seller receives the response, it copies the buyer's mailing address out of the response, makes note of the authorization code, and forwards the response message to the IPT.
The IPT hands the response to the BIA, which decrypts the private code and displays it on the LCD screen, indicating that the DPC recognized the buyer. The IPT also shows the result of the transaction as well, be it success or failure.
1.4.3.5. Security
Since the system in general assumes that an adversary inhabiting the network can hijack network connections at any point, all parties must have secure communications during their real-time interactions. The main concern isn't disclosure of information, but rather insertion or redirection of messages.
The whole system of Public Key Encryption relies on having a trusted source for the Public Keys. These trusted sources are called Certifying Authorities, one of which is the company VeriSign, Inc.
1.4.4. Terminal: Buyer Registration Terminal
1.4.4.1. Purpose
The purpose of the Buyer Registration Terminal (BRT) is to register new buyers including their biometric-PIN, mailing address, private code, and a list of financial accounts and account index codes that they can access, all using their biometric-PIN.
The objective of the enrollment process is to obtain personal information from a buyer at the location of a responsible institution where that information can be validated. This includes, but is not limited to retail banking outlets and credit card issuers. Each participating responsible institution has one or more BRTs that are used by employees who have been authorized to perform registrations. Each employee is accountable for each buyer registered.
1.4.4.2. Construction
The BRT consists of:
an microcomputer and screen, keyboard, mouse
a BIA/Reg
a modem or network connection
a buyer registration software application
The BRT uses an attached BIA/Reg for biometric entry, and is connected to the system by a modem or a network connection. Buyer Registration Terminals are located in places that are physically secure such as retail banking outlets.
1.4.4.3. Identification
Three entities need to be identified for the DPC to respond positively to a BIA/Reg registration message: the registering employee, the institution, and the BIA/Reg. The employee must have been authorized to register buyers for that institution.
The institution and the BIA are identified by cross-checking the owner of the BIA with the institution code set by the BRT. The employee identifies himself to the system by entering his biometric-PIN upon starting the registration application.
The institution uses its standard customer identification procedure (signature cards, employee records, personal information, etc.) before registering the buyer on the system. It is important for the institution to verify buyer identity as assiduously as possible, since the registering buyer will be empowered to make purchases and transfer money from those financial accounts at will.
1.4.4.4. Operation
During registration, the buyer enters both a primary and secondary registration biometric sample. The buyer must use both index fingers; if the buyer is missing index fingers, the next inner-most finger may be used. Requiring specific fingers to be used (such as the index finger) allows the prior fraud check to work.
The buyer is encouraged to select a primary and a secondary finger; the primary finger is given preference during the DPC identity check, so the buyer should present the most-often used finger as the primary. Of course, the DPC could choose to alter the designation of primary and secondary biometrics based on operations if it turns out to be important to do so.
As a part of the biometric encoding process, the BIA/R determines if the buyer has entered "a good print." If a good print is not present, the BIA/R asks the buyer to re-enter the biometric which was determined to be of poor quality.
The buyer selects a PIN of from four to twelve digits from a series of PIN options provided by the system's central database. However, the PIN must be validated by the system. This involves two checks: one, that the number of other buyers using the same PIN aren't too great (since the PIN is used to reduce the number of buyers checked by the biometric comparison algorithm), and that the buyer's registration biometric sample being registered isn't too similar to other buyer's biometrics stored within the same PIN group. If either happens, the enrollment is rejected, an error message is returned to the BRT, and the buyer is instructed to request a different PIN. The system may optionally return with an "identical match" error condition, which indicates that the buyer already has a record in the system under that PIN.
A PIN of 0 allows the system to assign a PIN to the buyer.
The buyer constructs a confidential private code consisting of a word or phrase. If the buyer does not wish to construct one, a private code will be constructed randomly by the terminal.
The buyer may also arrange their financial account code list. This list describes which account index code points at which account (e.g. 1 for debit, 2 for credit, 3 for emergency account index code linked to debit, etc.). For checking and savings accounts, the registering institution must be the bank or financial institution that provides the accounts. The buyer signs an agreement allowing the system to authorize financial transactions on their behalf when they present their biometric-PIN.
Even after registration, a buyer is not actually able to perform operations using the system until a prior fraud buyer re-registration check is completed. This generally takes a few minutes, but during times of high load, it takes up to several hours. Only if the system finds no instance of prior fraud is the buyer's access activated.
In an alternate embodiment, relatively low security registrations are accomplished at places such as supermarkets, over the Internet, or at unattended kiosks. Registrations at such places must be subsequently confirmed by a telephone call to the registering buyer using a telephone number gathered from credit or bank account records, or by sending a letter to the registering buyer's mailing address (also gathered from bank or credit account records) requiring him to call back and confirm the registration. The ability to authorize transactions will only be enabled once registration is confirmed.
If a financial account number is registered without the participation of the issuing institution, the financial account owner must sign an agreement at the time of registration authorizing the release of funds whenever a transaction is received by the system that is properly authorized using his biometric and PIN. Of course, confirmation of identity is still required to validate the signature, either through a telephone contact or an in-person examination of the registrant's identity documents. This confirmation is required in order to prevent buyers from registering other people's financial account numbers under their own biometric and PIN.
If a buyer does manage to register another buyer's financial accounts and make use of them for a period of time, once detected, the buyer's ability to authorize transactions will be disabled, and the buyer will be added to the prior fraud database preventing the buyer from re-registering until the matter is cleared up.
1.4.4.5. Security
If a buyer is found to have defrauded the system, the DPC institutes a database-wide involuntary biometric database search for the buyer. Several of these are performed each night, so buyers who are particularly wanted by the system can thus be winnowed out of the database by using a time consuming process during conditions of light activity.
The employees performing the registration operation identify themselves using biometric-PIN only when initially activating the registration system. This is a convenience for the employee, but a possible security problem for the system, as unattended or "temporarily borrowed" BRTs could be the source for fraud. As a result, the registration application exits after a predetermined period of no activity.
1.4.5. Terminal: Customer Service
1.4.5.1. Purpose
The purpose of the customer service terminal (CST) is to provide internal DPC support personnel access to the various aspects of the system databases. Support people need to answer inquiries by buyers, issuers, institutions, and sellers that are having trouble with the system, as well as registering new sellers with the system Buyers may wish to change mailing information, or even their PIN.
1.4.5.2. Construction
The CST consists of:
a microcomputer
a BIA/Int
ethernet/token ring/FDDI network interface
a database examination and modification application
Each CST is connected to the system via a high speed local area network connection such as token ring, Ethernet, fiber (FDDI), etc. Each CST has the capability to query each of the databases, and display the results of these queries. However, the CST only displays fields and records based on the privilege of the terminal user. For instance, a standard customer service employee won't be able to see the encryption code for a given BIA's VDB record, though they can see who currently owns that BIA.
1.4.5.3. Identification
For the CST to allow access to the database, the user and the BIA must be identified by the system. In addition, the employee's privilege level must also be determined, so that the database can restrict access appropriately.
1.4.5.4. Operation
An employee using a CST starts a session by providing identification by entering their biometric-PIN. The BIA constructs an Identification Request message, and send it to the DPC for verification. Once the system verifies the employee, the CST application can operate normally, though limited by the employee's previously assigned DPC privilege level.
1.4.5.5. Security
For security purposes, the DPC will terminate a connection to the CST application after a predetermined idle time period.
It is important that the database application cannot be modified in any manner; either deliberately, or through an unintentional introduction of a virus. To that end, CSTs do not have any floppy drives or other removable media. Furthermore, read access to the database application executable is strictly limited to those with a need to know.
In order to protect the communications between the CST and the database from surreptitious modification or disclosure, the CST encrypts all traffic between the CST and the database. To do this, the CST generates a session key that is sent to the server during the login session with the system. This session key is used to encrypt and decrypt all communications with the DPC that occur during the period.
Even assuming secure communications and no modified database applications, the DPC makes certain that DPC data fields that are not accessible to the individual operating the CST are not sent to the CST's database application. Likewise, at no time do any CST personnel have access to or permission to modify buyer biometric information.
The DPC and the support center can be co-located, or because of the fairly tight security surrounding the CST itself, the support center can be split off on its own.
1.4.6. Terminal: Issuer Terminal
1.4.6.1. Purpose
The purpose of the issuer terminal is to allow employees at issuing banks to submit batch financial account modification operations to the DPC in a secure and identifiable manner.
1.4.6.2. Construction
The IT consists of:
a microcomputer
a modem, X.25 network, or Internet connection to the system
a BlA/Iss
a network connection to the bank's internal network
The Issuer Terminal uses an issuer BIA to authorize mass additions and deletions of financial account information.
1.4.6.3. Identification
In this operation, the bank must be identified, a properly-authorized bank employee must be identified, and all of the buyers whose financial accounts are being added or removed must also be identified.
The bank is responsible for identifying the buyers who wish to add their fina |
